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Northern Ireland has been the scene of recurring and often horrify-
ing violence since 1969, as terrorist groups have clashed with each
other, with the British Army, and with the Royal Ulster Constabulary
(R.U.C.). The situation has been a difficult one for both the people and
the legal system of Northern Ireland: faced with the problem of highly
dedicated terrorists, the British government has had to confront di-
rectly the tension between its duty to protect public security and its
concomitant obligation to safeguard individual freedom. This Article
focuses on the British government's most recent legislative response to
this tension, the Emergency Provisions Act (EPA),' and appraises its
success in accommodating the competing demands of public safety and
private liberty.
The EPA cannot be assessed without some understanding of the his-
torical background of the current situation and of the different sources
of the violence wracking Northern Ireland. Section I of the Article is
intended to provide this information in capsule form. Section II ex-
plains the operation of the EPA, with particular attention to its breadth
and to its potentially counterproductive effects. The standards for the
admissibility of confessions to crimes covered, by the EPA and the lack
of procedures for the independent investigation and evaluation of com-
plaints against the security forces are analyzed in detail in Sections III
and IV, respectively. In Section V, the Article concludes with recom-
mendations for legal reform that would establish a better balance be-
tween the need for public security and the need for legal protection
against excessive or unnecessary intrusions on individual freedom.
I. Origin and Nature of the Present Conflict
British control of all of Ireland was consolidated in the sixteenth cen-
t J.D. Yale University, 1982.
1. Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act, 1978, ch. 5. The first version of the
EPA was enacted in 1973. See Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act, 1973, ch. 53.
Unless otherwise indicated, all citations in this Article are to the 1978 EPA.
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tury,2 and maintained for hundreds of years thereafter despite repeated
insurrections by Irish desirous of breaking the link that had been estab-
lished by force of arms.3 The Government of Ireland Act, passed by
the British Parliament in 1920,4 formally partitioned northern and
southern Ireland by establishing separate parliaments of limited powers
for each.5 The northern entity, composed of six counties within the
province of Ulster, became Northern Ireland, and has remained contin-
uously within the British domain.6 Under the terms of the Anglo-Irish
Treaty of 1921, 7 the southern entity, composed of the remaining
twenty-six counties of Ireland, became in 1922 the Irish Free State.8
Today it is the Republic of Ireland, which is completely independent of
Great Britain.9
The demographic fact that helped shape the creation of Northern
Ireland and that remains basic to the situation is that approximately
65% of the population are Protestants,' 0 the descendants of seven-
teenth-century Scottish and English colonists," whose religion 12 and
history differ from those of the Catholic minority. The Republic of
Ireland, on the other hand, has a predominantly Catholic population, 13
and a constitution that until recently conferred on the Catholic church
a special role in national affairs, 14 and that still outlaws divorce. 15
2. See Hayes-McCoy, The Tudor Conquest (1534-1603), in THE COURSE OF IRISH HIS-
TORY 174 (T. Moody & F. Martin eds. 1967).
3. Concise histories of Ireland include R. EDWARDS, AN ATLAS OF IRISH HISTORY
(1973); J. BECKETT, A SHORT HISTORY OF IRELAND (1973); THE COURSE OF IRISH HISTORY
(T". Moody & F. Martin eds. 1967); T. MOODY, THE ULSTER QUESTION: 1603-1973 (1974); L.
DE PAOR, DIVIDED ULSTER (1973).
4. See McCartney, From Parnell to Pearse (1891-1921), in THE COURSE OF IRISH His-
TORY, supra note 3, at 294, 311-12.
5. Government of Ireland Act, 1920, 10 & 11 Geo. 5, ch. 67; see R. HULL, THE IRISH
TRIANGLE, CONFLICT IN NORTHERN IRELAND 34 (1976).
6. R. HULL, supra note 5, at 19-20.
7. See Treaty, Dec. 6, 1921, Great Britain-Ireland, 26 L.N.T.S. 10.
8. See Irish Free State (Agreement) Act, 1922, 12 Geo. 5, ch. 4.
9. See R. HULL, supra note 5, at 19-21. Great Britain formally recognized this indepen-
dence with the passage of the Ireland Act of 1949. Ireland Act, 1949, 12, 13 & 14 Geo. 6, ch.
41.
10. IRELAND, A CHRONOLOGY AND FACT BOOK 143 (W. Griffin ed. and compiler 1973)
[hereinafter FACT BOOK].
11. See Clarke, The Colonisation of Ulster and the Rebellion of 1641 (1603-1660), in THE
COURSE OF IRISH HISTORY, supra note 3, at 189.
12. It should be noted that Protestantism in Northern Ireland is not monolithic; it em-
braces many separate sects. See FACT BOOK, supra note 10, at 143.
13. Data collected in 1961 indicated that about 90% of the population was Catholic. Id
This figure may actually understate the percentage of Catholics, for intermarriage during the
last generation is widely thought to have pushed the Catholic percentage over 95%. See
Perry, These Irish Eyes 4ren't Smiling on a Paddy's Day Parade, Wall St. J., Mar. 15, 1983, at
26, col. 3.
14. BUNREACHT NA HEIREANN (Constitution of Ireland), arts. 44.2, .3 (repealed 1972).
15. Id art. 41.3(2).
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Great Britain partitioned Ireland ostensibly to guarantee that the Prot-
estants in the North would be ensured political power in their own state
despite the existence of the overwhelming Catholic majority in the
South.16 The demographic consequence of this partition, however, was
to create a Catholic minority in Northern Ireland that itself has been
without political power. This demographic and political dilemma-
whether the Protestants in the North should be a minority as compared
with the Catholics throughout Ireland, or whether the Catholics in the
North should be a minority as compared with the Protestants there-
heretofore has proven insoluble.
While the conflict in Northern Ireland is often described as one pit-
ting the Protestant majority against the Catholic minority, this strictly
religious characterization obscures the true nature of the conflict. The
term "Protestant" describes that part of the population which traces its
lineage to the seventeenth-century colonists, and which is largely Prot-
estant, while the term "Catholic" describes the native Irish, who have
been predominantly Catholic since the fifth century. To the extent that
these sectarian labels imply that the conflict is a "religious war," that
Protestants are attacked because they attend a Protestant church, and
that Catholics are attacked because they attend a Catholic one, they are
misleading. Rather, the conflict should be understood as one between
the Unionists, or Loyalists, who wish to maintain the state of union
with Great Britain as a link to their heritage, and the Nationalists, or
the more militant Republicans, who wish to reinstitute an undivided
Ireland as a link to their heritage. Two related issues--the preservation
of historical and cultural ties, whether to Great Britain or to Ireland,
and the fact that political power may depend on which ties are pre-
served-have inspired the violence, not religious beliefs per se. 17 The
historical division between Unionist and Nationalist, and therefore be-
16. See R. HULL, supra note 5, at 55-56.
17. As described by The Times of London,
[t]here are two communities in Northern Ireland, different in their origins, nursing dif-
ferent historical myths, possessing distinguishable cultures, having different songs and
heroes, and wearing different denominations of the same religion. Religion is the clear-
est badge of these differences. But the conflict is not about religion. It is about the self-
assertion of two distinct communities, one of which is dominant in the public affairs of
the province.
The Times (London), Aug. 30, 1969, at 7, col. 1 (editorial) (emphasis in the original).
This is not to suggest that "sectarian" murders-ones committed against an individual
known to be of a certain religion-do not occur. The important point is that the victims in
such murders are likely to have been chosen because it is assumed that they also oppose the
political aspirations of their assassins. Politics in most cases has primacy over religion, al-
though the religious element plays some role, and the religious labels often are used for the
sake of convenience. Some Unionist factions, however, do stress the "evils" of Catholicism.




tween Protestant and Catholic, rendered even more acute by years of
discrimination against the minority, has made Northern Ireland fertile
ground for violence and civil unrest.
The Unionist Party, closely connected through much of its existence
to the often violently anti-Catholic Orange Order,' governed Northern
Ireland without interruption until 1972,19 when the imposition of direct
rule from Westminster effectively suspended parliamentary govern-
ment within Northern Ireland.20 It is now admitted that during this
period discrimination against the Catholic minority was widespread in
housing, employment, and the administration of justice.
21
Progress toward equality of opportunity in housing22 and employ-
ment23 has been made, but true economic equality between majority
and minority has not yet been realized.24 The burdens of inequality
have been complicated by the fact that Northern Ireland generally is
much poorer than the rest of the United Kingdom.25 Attempts to rem-
edy inequalities have been handicapped during the last decade by eco-
nomic decline, as continuing violence and the problems in the British
and world economies have combined to deter new industry from locat-
ing in Northern Ireland and to persuade some existing firms to close or
18. W. FLACKES, NORTHERN IRELAND, A POLITICAL DIRECTORY, 1968-1979, at 103
(1980).
19. T. MooDY, supra note 3, at 32, 48.
20. N6rthern Ireland (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1972, ch. 22 (authorization of direct
rule); see general, THE SUNDAY TIMES INSIGHT TEAM, ULSTER 280-310 (1972).
21. See THE SUNDAY TIMES INSIGHT TEAM, supra note 20, at 27-55 (general discussion
of discrimination); FAIR EMPLOYMENT AGENCY FOR NORTHERN IRELAND, AN INDUSTRIAL
AND OCCUPATIONAL PROFILE OF THE TWO SECTIONS OF THE POPULATION IN NORTHERN
IRELAND (1978) (general discussion of employment discrimination); R. MILLER, OCCUPA-
TIONAL MOBILITY OF PROTESTANTS AND ROMAN CATHOLICS IN NORTHERN IRELAND
(1979) (structural discrimination in occupational patterns); K. BOYLE, T. HADDEN & P.
HILLYARD, LAW AND STATE: THE CASE OF NORTHERN IRELAND, chs. 2, 7, 9 (1975) (dis-
crimination in the administration of justice).
22. Public housing is now being awarded on the basis of objective criteria, which has
reduced significantly concern about discriminatory awards. Housing remains a serious
problem, however, as 14.1% of the housing stock is classified as unfit for human habitation,
compared with 4.6% for England and Wales. Rowthorn, Northern Ireland- an economy in
crisis, 5 CAMBRIDGE J. ECON. 1, at 15 (1981).
23. The Fair Employment Agency, which was established to monitor public and private
employment practices, now requires the recipients of government contracts to hold Equal
Opportunity Certificates, which the agency may revoke upon findings of non-compliance
with their terms. See FAIR EMPLOYMENT AGENCY FOR NORTHERN IRELAND, SIXTH RE-
PORT AND SETTLEMENT OF ACCOUNTS 4-5, 10-12 (1982).
24. Rowthom, supra note 22, at 8-10, 18-22. This study found that "[m]any people con-
tinue to live in real poverty and deprivation-especially Catholics, who remain lower paid,
more poorly housed, and more prone to unemployment than Protestants." Id at 15.
25. The standard of living in Northern Ireland was substantially lower than that of the
United Kingdom generally until the late 1960's. Although important gains have been made
since then, average earnings remain lower, and unemployment higher than in the United
Kingdom as a whole. Id at 14-16.
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relocate.26
Catholic suspicions about fairness in the administration of justice
still run deep.27 The foundations for these fears are embedded deeply
in Irish history.28 In Northern Ireland, the Unionists maintained their
control from 1922 to 1972 with the help of the Special Powers Act,29 a
sweeping measure that gave authorities extraordinary powers of search
and seizure, internment, and censorship.30 The Act was supplemented
by additional regulations and statutes which prohibited, for example,
membership in proscribed organizations3' and the display of certain
flags and emblems.32 The Unionists used the legislation to stifle dissent
in the minority community, 3 which was not protected by a written sys-
tem of constitutional rights,34 and which lacked the political power to
26. Id at 16-18. It has been estimated that the conflict has destroyed or prevented the
creation of 25,000 manufacturing jobs in Northern Ireland. Id at 18. Unemployment in
Northern Ireland is now running at about 24% of the work force. Irish Times, Jan. 5, 1983,
at 9, col. 1.
27. The basis for these suspicions, embodied in an expression heard often in the poorer
Catholic communities that "there's one justice for 'them,' and another for 'us,' has been
thoroughly documented in K. BOYLE, T. HADDEN & P. HILLYARD, supra note 21, at cbs. 7,
9.
28. For example, in the eighteenth century the all-Protestant parliament of Ireland en-
acted a comprehensive set of anti-Catholic measures which forbade Catholics from holding
any government office, from entering the legal profession, and from holding commissions in
the army and navy. See Wall, The Age of the Penal Laws (1691-1778), in THE COURSE OF
IRISH HISTORY, supra note 3, at 217.
29. Civil Authorities (Special Powers) Act (Northern Ireland), 1922, N. Ir. Pub. Gen.
Acts, 12 & 13 Geo. 5, ch. 5, repealed by the Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act,
1973, ch. 53, § 31(2).
30. See Bishop, Law in the Control of Terrorism andInsurrection: The British Laboratory
Experience, 42 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 140, 157-58 (1978).
31. Bishop, supra note 30, at 159.
32. Flags and Emblems (Display) Act (Northern Ireland), 1954, N. Ir. Pub. Gen. Acts, 2
& 3 Eliz. 2, ch. 10.
33. The history of the special power laws in Northern Ireland, as well as the Catholic
perception of their effect, was offered in 1978 by Gerry Fitt, M.P. for West Belfast:
As anyone in Northern Ireland knows, emergency provisions legislation of this
description was first placed on the statute book in the Northern Ireland House of Com-
mons in 1922. It was known as the Special Powers Act. From 1922 until 1929 it was
renewed every twelve months by the Parliament in Northern Ireland. In 1929 the Gov-
ernment said that the Act should become a permanent part of Northern Ireland legisla-
tion. Therefore, it was not of necessity debated every year in the Northern Ireland
House of Commons.
Throughout those years certain sections and provisions of the Special Powers Act
were used against individuals in Northern Ireland. That did not stop the violence, it
increased it. Every year, at Easter, whenever there was a Royal visit or if there seemed
to be a heightening of tension between Republican and Loyalist communities, the Act
was brought into being, and though people were not charged, they were interned.
Looking back, we now see that such legislation as this is no guarantee that there will
be a diminution of violence.
959 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 1544 (1978) (statement of G. Fitt, M.P. for West Belfast).
34. Rose, On the Priorities of Citizenship in the Deep South and Northern Ireland, 38 J.




The Special Powers Act was justified on the ground that it was neces-
sary to combat a highly feared secret organization, the Irish Republican
Army (I.R.A.).35 Ironically, however, during the period from 1922 to
1968, the I.R.A. was largely inactive as a military unit in Northern Ire-
land.36 Nonetheless, official state visits by British dignitaries and Brit-
ish national holidays were marked by systematic arrests and temporary
detention of suspected I.R.A. members. 3
7
The current wave of violence began in 1968, when civil rights march-
ers protesting housing discrimination were attacked by Protestant mobs
and by members of a new disbanded all-Unionist reserve police force.38
The violence, which has continued with only brief respites, 39 has
sprung from several sources4° and has claimed thousands of victims
from both sides.41 On the side of the Republicans, two groups have
been especially active. The best known is the Provisional I.R.A.,42
35. See Bishop, supra note 30, at 157.
36. For example, its one northern "campaign," conducted by the I.R.A. from 1956 to
1962, resulted in the deaths of eighteen persons, the majority of them members of the I.R.A.
See J. BELL, THE SECRET ARMY, 321-97 (1972).
37. See supra note 33.
38. See THE SUNDAY TIMES INSIGHT TEAM, supra note 20, at chs. 1-4; DISTURBANCES
IN NORTHERN IRELAND: REPORT OF THE COMMISSION APPOINTED BY THE GOVERNOR OF
NORTHERN IRELAND, N. IR. CMD. No. 532 (1969) (Lord Cameron, Chairman) [hereinafter
CAMERON REPORT].
39. Almost 2,300 people have been killed, and over 25,000 seriously injured, in politi-
cally related violence since 1969. During the same period, over 12,000 bombs and incendi-
ary devices have been exploded in Northern Ireland, and 29,429 shooting incidents have
been reported. The violence peaked in 1972, the year after internment without trial was
introduced, and the first year of direct rule from Westminster, with almost twice as many
violent incidents as any of the next succeeding four years. ROYAL ULSTER CONSTABULARY,
CHIEF CONSTABLE'S ANNUAL REPORT 1982, at 48 (table 6) (1983). Violence declined
sharply in 1980. Id It escalated again in 1981, however, when 101 people were killed (44
members of the security forces, and 57 civilians, some terrorists), 578 bombs were exploded,
and 1,142 shooting incidents took place. Id
40. It has been estimated that of 2,250 politically related fatalities classified as of June,
1982, 53.2% were caused by Republican terrorist organizations, 27% by Loyalist organiza-
tions, 11.2% by security forces, and 8.2% by undetermined agents. McKeown, Numbering the
Dead- 4 Register of Northern Ireland's Casualties, IN DUBLIN, Dec. 16, 1982, at 20, 22.
41. Of the fatalities, 56.9% were civilians, 29.2% were members of the security forces,
11.5% were members of terrorist groups, and 2.4% could not be classified. Id Of the 1,885
dead who were natives of Northern Ireland, 1,016 were Catholic and 839 were Protestant.
Id Given that over half the fatalaties have been caused by Republican groups, the conclu-
sion seems inescapable that a substantial number of Catholics have died at the hands of
their co-religionists.
42. It is important to distinguish the Provisional I.R.A. from the Official I.R.A.--"Offi-
cial" because a majority of the delegates at a 1970 I.R.A. congress voted to support its posi-
tion. It maintained a distinct military presence until 1972, when it declared a unilateral
cease-fire on the ground that a majority of the population of Northern Ireland favored union
with the United Kingdom. Its policy, first announced in 1970, has been to work for full
minority rights within the United Kingdom, but also to support a decentralized government
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which has directed an assassination campaign against representatives
of the British Army, the R.U.C., the Ulster Defence Regiment
(U.D.R.-a kind of National Guard composed of volunteers from
Northern Ireland), and their respective reserves. 43 The Provisional
I.R.A. also has killed politicians, judges, prison employees, and mem-
bers of other terrorist groups, as well as hundreds of unintended vic-
tims.44 A second group, the Irish National Liberation Army (I.N.L.A.)
is the military .wing of the Irish Republican Socialist Party.45 It too
wages a military battle, sometimes with terrifying success, 46 but its
membership is apparently less numerous than that of the Provisional
I.R.A.4
7
Loyalist terrorist activity seems motivated by fears of a possible
union with the Republic of Ireland and by anger at what is perceived to
be violence directed against the Protestant and Loyalist majority com-
munity. This activity has been aimed primarily at Catholics, through
intimidation of families living in mixed areas and attacks on Catholic
pubs and individuals.48 Just as different Republic factions have en-
gaged in internecine strife, Loyalist groups occasionally have attacked
each other, although their differences appear to concern territorial con-
trol and racketeering more than differences in political and military
strategy.4
9
There are two major Loyalist terrorist organizations. The Ulster
Volunteer Force (U.V.F.) originated in the early twentieth century in
response to the "threat" posed by an independent Ireland, but then
largely disappeared after the partition of Ireland. 50 A group claiming
its name and heritage emerged violently in the 1960s, and was declared
illegal in 1966.51 This proscription was lifted briefly in 1974, when the
in Northern Ireland which, it believes, would lead eventually to union with the Irish Repub-
lic. See W. FLACKES, supra note 18, at 111-20.
43. See T. COOGAN, THE I.R.A. 461-81 (1980).
44. Id See also supra notes 39-41.
45. W. FLACKES, supra note 18, at 72.
46. The group claimed responsibility for the March, 1979 assassination of Airey Neave,
M.P., Conservative Shadow Secretary for Northern Ireland and close friend of Prime Minis-
ter Thatcher. Id It also claimed responsibility for a December, 1982 pub explosion which
left 16 people dead and 29 seriously injured. Wash. Post, Dec. 8, 1982, at A28, col. 3.
47. W. FLACKES, supra note 18, at 72.
48. See K. BOYLE, T. HADDEN & P. HILLYARD, TEN YEARS ON IN NORTHERN IRE-
LAND, 21-22 (1980) [hereinafter TEN YEARS ON]. It is easily, but not necessarily correctly,
argued that Loyalist terrorists are more "sectarian" than their more "political" Republican
counterparts. This apparent distinction is probably a function of the nature of the conflict.
Republican terrorists can pick "political" targets who are symbols of the political and eco-
nomic status quo, while Loyalist targets are more obviously "sectarian." Id
49. Id
50. M. DILLON & D. LEHANE, POLITCAL MURDER IN NORTHERN IRELAND 28 (1973).




U.V.F. undertook a short-lived political action campaign.5 2 It soon re-
verted to terrorism, however, and was banned again under the terms of
the EPA.
53
The second, and much larger, Loyalist organization, is the Ulster De-
fence Association (U.D.A.). Founded in 1971 to coordinate opposition
to the I.R.A. among various Protestant groups, 54 it has recruited large
numbers of working class Protestants from all over Northern Ireland.
55
Its initial purpose was to demonstrate the strength of opposition in
Northern Ireland to a united island, and to that end it organized im-
pressive and disciplined public military maneuvers.5 6 It changed its
position in 1977 and campaigned politically for the creation of a North-
ern Ireland independent of Great Britain and the Irish Republic.5 7 In
1981, however, during a hunger strike by Republican prisoners, the
U.D.A. abandoned the approach and returned to its Loyalist position.
58
While the U.D.A. has never been proscribed, it has played a major role
in the intimidation of Catholics, and few doubt that some of its mem-
bers have been involved in assassination and bombing.
5 9
The final actors in this military drama are the government forces,
which include some 30,000 members of the British Army and the
R.U.C.,60 and who patrol a country of 1.5 million inhabitants. 61 These
troops are ostensibly assisted in their efforts to maintain order by the
existence of emergency legislation, the scope and effects of which this
Article is intended to analyze.
II. The EPA: Protection of Public Security at the Expense of
Individual Freedom
Adopted in 1973 following the recommendation of a British govern-
ment commission chaired by Lord Diplock,62 the EPA has remained
52. W. FLAcKES, supra note 18, at 147.
53. Id
54. Id at 138-39.
55. Id at 138.
56. Id at 139.
57. Id at 140-41.
58. Interview with Andrew Tyrie, Chief of Staff, U.D.A., in Belfast, Northern Ireland
(Oct. 20, 1981).
59. TEN YEARS ON, supra note 48, at 20.
60. As of July, 1979, 13,000 regular soldiers and almost 12,000 police and reservists were
deployed in Northern Ireland. 969 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 934-35 (1979), (statement of
Humphrey Atkins, Secretary of State for Northern Ireland). By December 1980, the total
had climbed to 31,500. TEN YEARs ON, supra note 48, at 25.
61. NORTHERN IRELAND INFORMATION SERVICE, FACTS AT YOUR FINGERTIPS 4 (1981).
62. See REPORT OF THE COMMISSION TO CONSIDER LEGAL PROCEDURES TO DEAL WITH
TERRORIST ACTIVITIES IN NORTHERN IRELAND, CMD. 5, No. 5185 (1972) (Lord Diplock,
Chairman) [hereinafter DIPLOCK REPORT]. The EPA contained a provision repealing the
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fundamentally unaltered since its enactment. A government commit-
tee, chaired by Lord Gardiner and appointed in 1974 to assess the anti-
terrorist measures in the context of human rights and civil liberties,
recommended some important changes, 63 but essentially the EPA was
left intact. Sixteen semi-annual reviews of the EPA undertaken by the
British Parliament have resulted in only one major change: the power
of internment, which originally could be invoked at the discretion of
the Secretary of State, can now be invoked only with parliamentary
approval.64 At each review, the British government has recommended
continuation of the EPA,65 and Parliament has appeared willing to ac-
cept this recommendation virtually automatically. 66 A small but vocal
minority (about 20 of the approximately 670 members of Parliament)
has consistently criticized the invasions of individual freedom permit-
ted under the EPA,67 but it received no widespread support, at least
during the first fourteen renewal debates. 68
While the application of the EPA is confined to Northern Ireland, 69
its scope within the province is far-reaching. The Act applies primarily
to "scheduled offenses, '' 70 which generally constitute "terrorist" crimes
such as arson, kidnapping, use of explosives, and hijacking.71 It estab-
lished special police and judicial procedures to be used in the investiga-
Special Powers Act. EPA, 1973, ch. 53, § 31(2). It should be understood as the latest version
of the emergency laws that have been in effect in Northern Ireland since its establishment.
See supra notes 29-33 and accompanying text.
63. See REPORT OF A COMMITTEE TO CONSIDER, IN THE CONTEXT OF CIVIL LIBERTIES
AND HUMAN RIGHTS, MEASURES TO DEAL WITH TERRORISTS IN NORTHERN IRELAND, CMD.
5, No. 5847 (1975) (Lord Gardiner, Chairman) [hereinafter GARDINER REPORT]. The Gar-
diner Report's criticisms of the internment program were instrumental in persuading the
government to abandon internment in favor of the trial of suspected terrorists in special
courts. See id at para. 148, at 43; infra note 105 and accompanying text. The Report also
recommended that Parliament reaffirm judicial discretion to exclude the admission into evi-
dence of statements made under questionable circumstances. GARDINER REPORT, supra,
para. 50, at 17. The recommendation was not adopted. See infra notes 181-85 and accom-
panying text.
64. Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 1978 (Continuance) Order, 1980
STAT. INST., No. 1049.
65. See, e.g., 959 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 1499-1500 (1978) (statement of Roy Mason,
Secretary of State for Northern Ireland); 969 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 931-35 (1979)
(statement of Humphrey Atkins, Secretary of State for Northern Ireland).
66. See, e.g., 969 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 925-1066 (1979) (parliamentary debate on
continuation of the EPA); 959 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 1499-1586 (1978) (same).
67. See, e.g., 959 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 1539 (1978) (statement of Tom Litterick,
M.P. for Birmingham); 969 PAR.L. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 944 (1979) (statement of Brynmor
John M.P. for Pontypridd).
68. See infra notes 81-82 and accompanying text.
69. EPA § 36(2).




tion and trial of scheduled offenses.72 It permits arrest and search
without warrant of those suspected of "committing, having committed,
or being about to commit" offenses covered by the EPA,7 3 and makes it
illegal for those witnessing or having knowledge of terrorist incidents to
refuse to cooperate with the authorities. 74 Persons suspected of being
terrorists may be arrested without warrant and detained for up to sev-
enty-two hours .75 Moreover, its extraordinary powers are not limited
to scheduled offenses: British troops are permitted to arrest and detain
temporarily without charge or warrant any individual suspected of any
crime.76 The EPA also creates new categories of crimes, such as wear-
ing hoods in public, 77 and retains many features of earlier emergency
laws.78 Given this scope, the conclusion that the EPA has touched the
lives of many thousands of people in Northern Ireland is inescapable.
British government officials have acknowledged the wide sweep of
the EPA as well as its intrusive character. Merlyn Rees, a former Sec-
retary of State for Northern Ireland, described its scope as follows:
-all terrorist type offenses to be categorized as "scheduled offenses";
-trials of scheduled offenses to be by a senior judge, sitting alone [no
right to a jury trial], but with more than usual rights of appeal;
-bail in scheduled cases to be given only by the High Court (rather than
by a magistrate) and then only if stringent precautions were made;
-the arrest without warrant and detention by the police for up to 72
hours of any person suspected of being a terrorist...;
-the arrest and detention of a suspect [for any offense] for up to four
hours by members of the Army;
-wide powers of search and seizure by members of the security forces;
-reversal of the normal onus of proof in relation to offenses of possession
of arms and explosives;
72. See, e.g., id § 2 (special conditions for bail); id § 6 (special courts for trial of sched-
uled offenses); id § 7 (no jury trials of scheduled offenses).
73. Id §§ 13, 14.
74. Section 18 of the EPA provides that "any member of Her Majesty's forces on duty or
any constable may stop and question any person for the purpose of ascertaining" the per-
son's identity and movements "and what he knows concerning any recent explosion or other
incident .... Failure to stop or refusal to answer to the best of one's "knowledge or
ability" can result in six months in prison or £100 fine, or both. Id § 18.
75. Id § 13. Other anti-terrorist legislation permits the detention of suspected terrorists
for periods up to seven days. Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1976, ch.
8, § 12(2).
76. Id § 14(1).
77. Id § 26.
78. For example, section 21 of the EPA prohibits membership in proscribed organiza-
tions. Id § 21. This offense is analogous to one defined under regulations issued pursuant
to the Special Powers Act. See supra note 31 and accompanying text. Both the Provisional
I.R.A. and the U.V.F. are proscribed. EPA § 21, sched. 2.
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-a fresh system of detention by the executive.79
Acknowledging the severity of the measure at the time of its enactment,
then Secretary of State William Whitelaw declared that "[tlhe Bill con-
tains some features unpalatable to a democratic society. Her Majesty's
government does not disguise the fact that it imposes serious limita-
tions on the traditional liberty of the subject."
80
The bipartisan consensus that had supported automatic continuation
of the EPA broke down in 1981, when the British Labour Party sup-
ported a motion introduced in Parliament that called for a broad inves-
tigation of the operation of the Act.81 In analyzing the emergence of
opposition to the EPA, it may be noted that the Act has generated two
distinct but related concerns: (1) that the EPA must be scrutinized be-
cause it contemplates intolerable violations of individual rights; and
(2) that the EPA, when considered instrumentally, must be judged a
failure because its counterproductive effects--the possible swelling of
terrorist ranks, and the erosion of respect for law and order-fuel the
very crisis that the EPA was intended to quell.
8 2
Regarding the first concern, while it is undeniable that the right to
live is the most basic human right, and that the right to live without
fear of death or grievous bodily injury is almost equally central, it
seems undeniable that the government's responsibility to protect indi-
vidual freedom has been seriously compromised under the emergency
regime. Military forces are virtually omnipresent.83 Almost 300,000
warrantless home searches were authorized between 1971 and June,
1978.84 These home searches occurred at an average rate of about
ninety per day.8 5 Between 1972 and 1978 more than 25,000 persons
were arrested and detained for periods ranging from four hours to
79. Rees, Terror in Ireland-and Britain's Response, in BRITISH PERSPECTIVES ON TER-
RORISM 83, 84 (P. Wilkin on ed. 1981).
80. PEACE PEOPLE, THE CASE FOR THE REPLACEMENT OF THE EMERGENCY PROVISION
ACT BY NORMAL JUDICIAL PROCESS 3 (n.d.) (quoting William Whitelaw) (on file with The
Yale Journal of World Public Order).
81. See 7 PARL. DEB., H.C. (6th ser.) 1032-46 (1981). The motion was defeated by a vote
of 279 to 213. Id at 1046.
82. J. Don Concannon, M.P. and former Minister of State for Northern Ireland, articu-
lated these concerns as follows:
[wihile we fully accept the need to protect the community against terrorism, we are
deeply concerned about the erosion of basic civil liberties. The continued and unre-
viewed emergency powers as they stand may impede the possibilities of a peaceful
settlement.
Id at 1040.
83. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
84. PEACE PEOPLE, TIME FOR A CHANGE 8 (1980) (parliamentary submission) (on file





seven days.8 6 Of those detained between September, 1977 and August,
1978, only about 35% were ultimately charged with an offense.87 In the
first ten months of 1980, 3,868 persons were arrested by the police and
army under the EPA.88 A mere 8.6% of those arrested were eventually
prosecuted,89 compared with an 80 to 90% average for those arrested in
England and Wales.90
Important as this immediate concern for human rights may be, it can
be argued that the second concern-that the EPA produces longterm
counterproductive effects-is even more fundamental. If the EPA cre-
ates resentment, drives people into the terrorist groups, and under-
mines basic respect for the rule of law across Northern Ireland, it may
be exacerbating the violence it was designed to combat and making it
even more difficult to achieve a definitive resolution of the situation
that would guarantee public security and basic individual freedom.
With respect to the relationship between the EPA and the recruit-
ment of terrorists, it seems plausible that the incursions into homes
through search and seizure and the arrest and detention of persons
without warrant or charge may encourage the involvement of young
people in the violence. It should be noted that the current violence is
largely the product of young people who have grown up since the be-
ginning of the most recent period of terror. Two-thirds of those serving
prison terms longer than four years were under fifteen years of age
when the current emergency began; one-third were under nine.91
Northern Ireland, which formerly had the lowest per capita prison pop-
ulation in Western Europe, now has the highest and youngest.92 More-
86. TIME FOR A CHANGE, supra note 84, at 9.
87. See REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE OF INQUIRY INTO POLICE INTERROGATION PROCE-
DURES IN NORTHERN IRELAND app. I, at 141, CMD. 5, No. 7497 (1979) (His Honor H.G.
Bennett, Chairman) [hereinafter BENNETT REPORT].
88. 945 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 271, 605-06 (1980) (response of Humphrey Atkins,
Secretary of State, to written parliamentary question no. 49).
89. Id Given that so few of those detained under the EPA are ever charged with an
offense, concern has arisen that the provisions of the EPA are not being used to investigate
terrorist incidents, but rather to compile information about individuals and even entire com-
munities. One recent survey found that 72% of a geographically and socioeconomically di-
verse sample of arrestees were not questioned about their involvement in specific incidents
at all. See D. WALSH, ARREST AND INTERROGATION: NORTHERN IRELAND 1981 (1981) (on
file with The Yale Journal of World Public Order).
90. See ROYAL COMMISSION ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, REPORT, CMD. 5, No. 8092,
para. 3.17, at 43, para. 4.43, at 83 (1981).
91. NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE, THE CORRYMEELA CONFERENCE (OCTOBER 1979) ON
PRISONS IN NORTHERN IRELAND, 1980 ONWARDS, WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE
LONG-TERM PRISONER 13 (Chart 3) (1979) (government paper submitted to the conference)
(on file with The Yale Journal of World Public Order).
92. THE PEACE PEOPLE, THE H-BLOCK PROTEST, HUNGER STRIKES AND EMERGENCY
LAW 7 (1980) (on fie with The Yale Journal of World Public Order).
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over, one study of the backgrounds of terrorists has concluded that
most I.R.A. operations are carried out by recent recruits whose back-
grounds make them representative members of the working class Cath-
olic communities in which they live.93 In short, many of the terrorists
at work are typical members of a younger generation that has grown up
with violence and with the extreme measures taken to curtail it.
While the history and traditions of the Catholic communities in
Northern Ireland ensure substantial resentment of British security
forces and justice,94 the process by which this general resentment is
translated in individual cases into active support of a terrorist group is
not clear. Perhaps the internment of a relative without trial or the de-
struction of property during a pre-dawn house search, or harassment
on a local street might be sufficient to push a Catholic youth into mem-
bership in the youth wing of the Provisional I.R.A. But even given this
uncertainty, the potential effects of the searches permitted under the
EPA on terrorist recruitment is enormous. If only 2% of the 600 fami-
lies whose homes were searched each week between 1970 and 1978 pro-
duced terrorist volunteers, the Provisional I.R.A. could have afforded a
complete turnover every year in its corps of 500 active duty
volunteers. 95
The second pernicious effect of the EPA is that it may be undermin-
ing the respect for law and order necessary for a peaceful long-term
solution to the crisis. This danger was recognized nine years ago in the
Gardiner Report, which noted that the basic strategy of the terrorists
was to provoke governmental reactions that would destroy the popular
support that the government would otherwise enjoy.96 It also noted
that short-time measures might restore order, but that long-term solu-
tions required popular support.97 Unfortunately, these warnings do not
appear to have been heeded, as the government, at least since the pas-
93. Boyle, Hadden & Hillyard, Emergency Powers: Ten Years On, FORTNIGHT, Jan.
1980, at 3, 4. The authors based their conclusions on their systematic review of the record in
cases adjudicated by the courts of Northern Ireland in 1975 and 1979. See also TIME FOR
CHANGE, supra note 84, at 9-10.
94. See supra notes 27-34 and accompanying text.
95. A secret paper of the British Ministry of Defence estimated that the Provisional
I.R.A. had 500 "activist" members. MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, NORTHERN IRELAND FUTURE
TERRORIST TRENDS, at G-1 (Dec. 15, 1978) (on file with The Yale Journal of World Public
Order). A copy of the report was diverted and made public. The numerical strength of
terrorist groups is, for obvious reasons, difficult to estimate accurately.
96. GARDINER REPORT, supra note 63, para. 17, at 7. For a discussion of this strategy
generally, see R. CLUTTERBUCK, LIVING wITH TERRORISM 17 (1975); P. WILKINSON, TER-
RORISM AND THE LIBERAL STATE 66 (1977).




sage of the EPA, has focused almost exclusively on imposing repressive
measures, and not on building a long-term consensus.
Even accepting the primacy of the EPA's short-term goal-the sup-
pression of violence--the EPA must be adjudged a failure, because vio-
lence continues to wrack Northern Ireland.98 Because the Act has
failed to stop the terror, the population has lost confidence and has
grown angry at the legal system, which has deprived individuals of ba-
sic civil liberties without offering any compensating increase in per-
sonal security. While the issue is not susceptible to quantitative
analysis-for obvious reasons the participants are unwilling to speak-
it seems plausible that as this loss of confidence and anger grow, the net
effect of the EPA may be to produce more violence, not less.
The loss of respect for law is a dangerous development in any coun-
try, but especially so in Northern Ireland, where history guarantees a
long and deep popular memory of civil strife.99 Decision-makers
should assess carefully whether measures implemented for short-term
gains are outweighed by less tangible but more dangerous long-term
consequences. While some form of emergency law will probably con-
tinue in Northern Ireland, further reliance on the deprivation of liberty
demonstrates that the government itself is not fully committed to the
rule of law as the appropriate vehicle to preserve public order. Thus,
so long as the current crisis lasts, the daily impact of emergency law
must be tempered by respect for the equitable administration of justice.
III. Admissibility Standards
A detailed analysis of the admissibility standards created under the
EPA suggests strongly that the EPA should be reformed to make inad-
missible as evidence statements obtained from persons interrogated
under suspicious circumstances.
Section 8 of the EPA provides that any statement made by the ac-
cused during the investigation of a scheduled offense is admissible un-
less the accused can present "prima facie evidence" that he or she was
"subjected to torture, inhuman or degrading treatment" for the purpose
of inducing a statement.1°° This new standard represents a substantial
98. See supra notes 193-96 and accompanying text.
99. DIPLOCK REPORT, supra note 62, para. 13, at 9.
100. Section 8 of the EPA (formerly section 6) provides that:
(1) In any criminal proceedings for a scheduled offence, or two or more offences
which are or include scheduled offences, a statement made by the accused may be
given in evidence by the prosecution in so far as-
(a) it is relevant to any matter in issue in the proceedings; and
(b) it is not excluded by the court in pursuance of subsection (2) below.
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erosion of the traditional common law principle of voluntariness, under
which a statement was admissible only if offered freely.' 0' The new
standard is also dangerously vague, because it leaves uncertain how
much abuse constitutes "inhuman or degrading treatment."10 2 This is-
sue is of more than academic concern. Permitting the security forces to
mistreat prisoners to the point of "torture, inhuman or degrading treat-
ment" has ensured that this provision of the EPA would generate enor-
mous tension and controversy. 10 3 Finally, reflecting the standard's
vagueness, the courts of Northern Ireland have proven incapable of
interpreting it in a coherent fashion.' ° 4 These factors make a powerful
argument that the standard should be fundamentally changed.
A. The Controversy
Since 1975 the anti-terrorist strategy of the British government has
been to eschew internment, in which detainees were held up to four
years without charge or trial, in favor of the pursuit of convictions in
the courts. 0 5 Those accused of terrorist offenses have been tried by
special non-jury "Diplock Courts" created by the EPA in 1973.106 The
(2) If, in any such proceedings where the prosecution proposes to give in evidence a
statement made by the accused, prima facie evidence is adduced that the accused
was subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment in order to induce
him to make the statement, the court shall, unless the prosecution satisfies it that
the statement was not so obtained-
(a) exclude the statement, or
(b) if the statement has been received in evidence, either-
(i) continue the trial disregarding the statement; or
(ii) direct that the trial shall be restarted before a differently constituted
court (before which the statement in question shall be inadmissible).
(3) This section does not apply to a summary trial.
EPA § 8 (emphasis added).
101. See infra notes 136-37 and accompanying text.
102. See infra notes 186-88 and accompanying text.
103. See infra notes 116-27 and accompanying text.
104. See infra notes 168-79 and accompanying text.
105. Internment, which had been the official strategy since 1971, proved counterproduc-
tive. See K. BOYLE, T. HADDEN & P. HILLYARD, supra note 21, at 55-77. In the four
months following its implementation in 1971, the number of murders increased twelvefold
over the number committed in the preceding four months. SUNDAY TIMES INSIGHT TEAM,
supra note 20, at 269. The Gardiner Report severely criticized the internment strategy.
GARDINER REPORT, supra note 63, para. 148, at 43. Its criticisms helped persuade the gov-
ernment to change strategy. TEN YEARS ON, supra note 48, at 24.
Nearly 2,000 people, including only 107 Protestants, were interned without trial for vary-
ing periods of time between August, 1971 and December, 1975. N.Y. Times, Dec. 6, 1975, at
1, col. 1, at 6, col. 2. The power of internment is still on the books, EPA § 12, sched. 1, but it
can be invoked only with parliamentary approval. See supra note 64 and accompanying
text. It has not been used since 1975. TEN YEARS ON, supra note 48, at 24. The government
continues to retain and to use its significant powers of temporary detention. EPA §§ 11, 14;
see supra notes 75, 86 and accompanying text.
106. The courts are known by the name of the chairman of the commission that recom-
Northern Ireland
hope of the government has been that the return to the rule of law-
symbolized by the end of internment-would alleviate the deep-seated
mistrust of the legal system prevalent in the Catholic community.10 7
The basic problem with this hope has been that the emergency regime
of the EPA, despite the suspension of internment, cannot be viewed as
normal law.108
In particular, section 8, by removing the common law test of volunta-
riness in the admissibility of confessions, has caused major changes in
traditional police and legal procedure. At the police level, a shift has
occurred from pre-arrest acquisition of independent evidence to post-
arrest interrogation as the primary tool of gathering evidence. 109 At the
trial level, a shift has occurred from the jury's determination of the
accused's guilt or innocence to judicial rulings on the admissibility of
the accused's confession' 0-rulings that, given the reliance on confes-
sions, are practically dispositive of the question of guilt or innocence.
During 1976 and 1977, the two years after internment was aban-
doned, 3,147 persons were charged with scheduled offenses under the
EPA."I A conviction was obtained in 94% of these cases, a figure not in
itself alarming." 2 However, between 70 and 90% of these convictions
were based wholly or mainly on admissions made to the police and
held admissible by the courts under section 8.'1 3 At the same time, the
number of complaints of ill treatment during interrogation increased
from 180 in 1975 to 384 in 1976,"1 and almost 1100 for 1977 and 1978
combined." 5
mended their establishment. See DIPLOCK REPORT, supra note 62, at paras. 35-41, at 17-19.
Among their special features are the lack of jury trial, EPA § 7, and the reversal of the
burden of proof in bail proceedings and trials of possession offenses. EPA §§ 2, 9. For a
general discussion of the operation of Diplock Courts, see TEN YEARS ON, supra note 48, at
57-88.
107. See TEN YEARS ON, supra note 48, at 102.
108. See supra notes 69-80 and accompanying text.
109. Grier, The Admissibility of Confessions Under the Northern Ireland (Emergency Pro-
visions) Act, 31 N. IR. L.Q. 205, 208 (1980).
110. Id
111. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, REPORT OF AN AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL MISSION TO
NORTHERN IRELAND 2 (1978) (AI Index EUR 45/01/78) (reporting data supplied by the
R.U.C.).
112. Sunday Times (London), Oct. 23, 1977, at 3, col. I (reporting research of the Law
Department, Queen's University, Belfast).
113. Id Research on the evidence used against defendants in Diplock trials between
January and April, 1979 indicates that in 56% of the cases a statement from the defendant
was the only evidence, in 30% of the cases the evidence consisted of the defendant's state-
ment and other evidence, in 6% of the cases no statement was made, and in 6% of the cases
the nature of the evidence could not be determined. TEN YEARS ON, supra note 48, at 44.
114. TEN YEARS ON, supra note 48, at 39.
115. TIME FOR A CHANGE, supra note 84, at 17.
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The opening of special police interrogation centers at Castlereagh
and Gough Army Barracks was accompanied by large increases in the
number of complaints of ill treatment during interrogation made
against the police. 116 Such complaints were made by the Northern Ire-
land Civil Rights Association, by representatives of the mainly Catho-
lic Social Democratic and Labour Party, 117 by the Catholic Church,'18
and by solicitors defending alleged terrorists in the Diplock Courts."19
The Ulster Defence Association and the Loyalist-oriented Ulster Civil
Liberties Advice Center also complained, 20 which indicates that the
perception of ill treatment was not confined to the Catholic community.
The wave of complaints received widespread publicity through two na-
tional television documentaries.' 2' Finally, after the Police Surgeons
Association began to speak out,' 22 and Amnesty International issued a
damning report about the situation, 2 3 the government appointed a
Committee of Inquiry into Police Interrogation Procedures in Northern
Ireland-the Bennett Committee. 24
The Bennett Committee was not empowered to investigate individ-
ual complaints, as could Amnesty International, 25 but nevertheless in
its March 1979 report it found that there were cases "in which injuries,
whatever their precise cause, were not self-inflicted and were sustained
in police custody."' 2 6 The Committee's report contained sixty-four
findings and recommendations designed to improve the supervision of
interrogation and to eliminate the possibility of further abuses. 127
These recommendations included installing closed-circuit T.V. in all
interview rooms, 2 8 limiting the length of interviews and the number of
116. TEN YEARS ON, supra note 48, at 39; see generally P. TAYLOR, BEATING THE TER-
RORISTS? INTERROGATION IN GOUGH AND CASTLEREAGH ch. 7 (treatment at Castelreagh)
& ch. 12 (treatment at Gough).
117. See AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, supra note 111, at 3 (complaints of Northern Ire-
land Civil Rights Association and Social Democratic and Labour Party).
118. Id (statements of Tomas O'Fiach, Archbishop of Armagh).
119. Id at 3-4 (solicitors' letter of complaint to Secretary of State).
120. Id at 3 (dossier compiled by Ulster Defence Association), 4 (videotape produced
by Advice Center).
121. See P. TAYLOR, supra note 116, at 163-64 (March 1977 BBC broadcast of interview
alleging mistreatment) & at 221-22 (October 1977 Thames Television Company broadcast of
"Inhuman and Degrading Treatment").
122. Id at 261. Doctors working at the Crumlin Road Jail examined the medical
records of forty-four prisoners and found twenty-eight to have significant physical injuries.
Id
123. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, supra note 111.
124. See BENNETr REPORT, supra note 87.
125. Id para. 2, at 1.
126. Id para. 163, at 55.
127. Id para. 404, at 135-40.




interviewers, 129 promulgating a formal code of conduct for interview-
ers, 130 and granting an absolute right of access to a solicitor after a
person had been detained forty-eight hours in custody.' 3' The govern-
ment has formally accepted most of these recommendations, 132 though
questions have been raised as to whether that commitment has been
honored fully in practice. 133 But even accepting that improvements
were made as a result of the Bennett Committee report, the basic diffi-
culties created by the section 8 legal standard remain.
B. Legal Debate- Standards Old and New
The Diplock Commission, whose recommendations guided the draft-
ing of the EPA,'34 believed that the then prevailing common law stan-
dard regarding the admissibility of confessions so favored the
defendant in Northern Ireland that in the struggle against terrorism the
authorities were being forced to rely on the detention of suspected ter-
rorists and not on their trial ii courts of law. 35 The necessary implica-
tion of the Commission's judgment was that to foster a return to the
rule of law symbolized by judicial trials, it was necessary to suspend an
important legal protection-the principle of voluntariness in the admis-
sibility of confessions.
The principle of voluntariness, operative throughout the United
Kingdom before the enactment of the EPA, was deeply established in
the common law.' 36 It is well summarized in an official R.U.C. manual
that describes the law of evidence outside the context of the EPA: "The
129. Id para. 404(24), at 137.
130. Id para. 404(25), at 137.
131. Id para. 404(45), at 138-39.
132. NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE, ACTION To BE TAKEN ON THE RECOMMENDATIONS
OF THE COMMITTEE OF INQUIRY INTO POLICE INTERROGATION PROCEDURE IN NORTHERN
IRELAND (n.d.) (on fie with The Yale Journal of World Public Order).
133. See Walsh, Arrest and Interrogation, in THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE IN
NORTHERN IRELAND 6 (proceedings of conference held in Belfast, June 13, 1981) (on file
with he Yale Journal of World Public Order). Walsh found that recommendations regard-
ing the permitted number of detectives involved in interrogation and the right of access to
solicitors were often ignored. Id at 7.
134. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
135. DIPLOCK REPORT, supra note 62, para. 87, at 31.
136. See Ibrahim v. Rex, [1914-15] All E.R. 874. The case involved the appeal of a
soldier who had been convicted of murder, the issue of the admissibility of the defendant's
confession was raised because he had confessed when asked by his commanding officer why
he had committed the crime. After reviewing the development of the common law doctrine
on admissibility, Lord Sumner concluded that
[i]t has long been established as a positive rule of English criminal law that no state-
ment by an accused is admissible in evidence against him unless it is shown by the
prosecution to have been a voluntary statement, in the sense that it has not been ob-
tained from him either by fear of prejudice or hope of advantage exercised or held out
by a person in authority.
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accepted test of voluntariness is in these terms:-The confession must
not have been induced by threat of prejudice or detriment or hope of
advantage of a temporal character held out by a person in authority, or
by oppression."'' 37 The Diplock Commission recommended that the
law be changed so that in trials of scheduled offenses confessions ob-
tained in violation of the principle might still be admissible. 138 Its pro-
posed substitute rule, derived from Article 3 of the European
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms,1 39 was to make statements admissible unless "torture or...
inhuman or degrading treatment" was used to induce them. 140 This
suggestion, adopted in what is now section 8 of the EPA,' 4' represented
a sharp and obvious departure from the principle of voluntariness.
1. Non-physical Force Atmosphere-Flaws in the Diplock
Commission's Approach to Interrogation
The Diplock Commission clearly foresaw that the new admissibility
standard would permit interrogators to use psychological pressure to
induce confessions. It stated that the proposed standard would permit
the creation of a psychological atmosphere in which the person being
Id at 877.
This venerable doctrine still plays an important role in British criminal law. See Director
of Public Prosecutions v. Ping Lin, [1975] 3 All E.R. 175 (House of Lords). In this case a
drug possession conviction was upheld after a finding that any hint of inducement in the
questioning of the defendant had been overcome by three specific refusals by the police to
make a deal. The language of the opinion laid out the principle of voluntariness in virtually
the same language as had been used in the Ibrahim case of some sixty years before. Id at
175.
The voluntariness test has also been accepted by the courts of Northern Ireland in decid-
ing cases outside the context of the EPA. See Regina v. Corr, 1968 N. Ir. L.R. 193 (C.C.A.).
The court found admissible statements made by the defendant after questioning by the po-
lice. Although the appellant made no allegations of oppressive, harsh, or misleading interro-
gation, the court noted in dicta that even "vigorous cross-examination" might have been
enough to render the admission involuntary.
The effect of a vigorous cross-examination or. . . of a series 'of searching interrogato-
ries' on one who is not free to get away from his questioner may, in certain circum-
stances, be to arouse hope of release or fear of further detention or other prejudicial
result in the mind of the suspect according to whether or not he makes answers or keeps
silent. But it also acts more directly by subjecting the person questioned to a degree of
pressure which saps his will and makes him talk. We think such pressure may well...
suffice to make statements obtained by it inadmissible in point of law.
Id at 211.
137. K. MASTERSON, EVIDENCE IN CUMINAL CASES 21 (1978).
138. DIPLOCK REPORT, supra note 62, para. 89, at 32.
139. See European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Liberties, art. 3, 213 U.N.T.S. 221; DIPLOCK REPORT, supra note 62, para. 90, at 32. Article
3 is not an admissibility standard per se; rather, it flatly prohibits the use of "torture, inhu-
man or degrading treatment."
140. DIPLOCK REPORT, supra note 62, para. 89, at 32.
141. See supra note 139.
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questioned would be more willing to speak, and, furthermore, that in
creating this atmosphere the use of "promises of favours" and "indica-
tions of [unfavorable] consequences" to induce statements was al-
lowed.142 The common law standard excluding statements made in
"hope of advantage" or under "threat of detriment" thus was clearly
rejected. The Commission believed that modem techniques of interro-
gation, which seek to create in the suspect the desire to confide in the
questioner, do "not involve cruel or degrading treatment." 143 The ac-
tual or threatened use of violence, however, was to continue to render a
confession inadmissible. 44
At the Castlereagh and Gough interrogation centers, both of which
have been designed to intensify the prisoner's sense of isolation and
thereby create the "psychological atmosphere" foreseen by the Diplock
Commission, 45 suspects are kept isolated for up to seven days."46 They
suffer severe stress and fatigue. 147 The future appears grim-they may
believe they will be beaten or will receive long prison sentences-and
they are kept awake long hours and probably find it difficult to sleep in
a strange and frightening environment. 48 Each day relaxed interroga-
tion teams start the questioning anew, alternately menacing or be-
friending the disoriented suspect. 14 9 Evidence indicates that these
techniques succeed relatively quickly, as "even the strongest wills"
weaken due to isolation, stress, fatigue, and uncertainty.1
50
Psychological pressure theoretically may be sufficient to produce
confessions, but in the atmosphere sanctioned by the Diplock Commis-
sion it was perhaps inevitable that the psychological approach would
be mixed with or give way to violence. As has been seen, evidence
from numerous and diverse sources suggests that violent interrogation
has occurred frequently.' 5
1
142. DIPLocK REPORT, supra note 62, para. 89, at 32.
143. Id para. 84, at 30.
144. Id para. 91, at 32. The Commission's attitude toward violence may be inferred
from the following:
[w]e do not think that... the polie ... should be discouraged from creating by means
which do not involvephysical violence, the threat of it, or any other inhuman or degrading
treatment, a situation in which a guilty man is more likely than he otherwise would
have been. . . to speak ....
Id (emphasis added).
145. See TEN YEARS ON, supra note 48, at 45.
146. Id at 45-46.
147. Id at 46.
148. Id
149. Id
150. Id at 45.
151. See supra notes 116-22 and accompanying text.
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2. "Torture, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment"--aws in the
Doplock Standard
The second major problem with the section 8 admissibility standard
is that it is fundamentally ambiguous in two critical respects. First, an
important inconsistency separates the Diplock Commission's intended
interpretation of "torture, inhuman or degrading treatment" and the
interpretation of that standard by the European Commission on
Human Rights, to whose decisions, given the origins of the standard, 1 52
the courts of Northern Ireland inevitably have looked for guidance.
Second, it is unclear to what extent the section 8 standard preserves the
common law tradition of judicial discretion in ruling on the admissibil-
ity of confessions. These two ambiguities have combined to produce
enormous and dangerous confusion.
The European Commission offered a thorough interpretation of the
"torture, inhuman or degrading treatment" standard in its opinion in
the 1969 Greek Case (Denmark v. Greece).153 The case involved a com-
plaint by four countries brought against Greece over its suspension of
certain constitutional rights afforded its citizens, as well as its alleged
torture of political prisoners. In sustaining some of the allegations of
the complaint the Commission rendered the following definitions:
Inhuman treatment: at least such treatment as deliberately causes severe
suffering, mental or physical, which in the particular situation is
unjustifiable.1
5 4
Torture: often used to describe inhuman treatment, which has a purpose,
such as the obtaining of information, or confession, or the infliction
of punishment, and it is generally an aggravated form of inhuman
treatment. 155
Non-physical torture: the infliction of mental suffering by creating a state
of anguish and stress by means other than bodily assault.15 6
Degrading treatment: treatment or punishment of an individual may be
said to be degrading if it grossly humiliates him before others or
drives him to act against his will or conscience.' 57
The Commission's majority opinion stated that a distinction must be
drawn between acts prohibited by Article 3 and "a certain roughness of
treatment [that] may take the form of slaps or blows of the hand on the
152. See supra note 139 and accompanying text.
153. 1969 [THE GREEK CASE] Y.B. EUR. CONy. ON HUMAN RGHTS 1 (Eur. Comm'n on
Human Rights). The case was a consolidation of applications by Denmark, Norway, Swe-
den, and the Netherlands.
154. Id at 186.
155. d
156. Id at 461.





An illustration of the Commission's view of this distinction may be
found in the case of X against the United Kingdom, 59 a routine crimi-
nal case in which the applicant claimed to have been attacked by a
police dog and assaulted twice while handcuffed. 160 While the Com-
mission rejected the applicant's version of the facts, it concluded in
dicta that even on its face the application did "not disclose a treatment
so serious as to amount to inhuman or degrading treatment within the
meaning of Art. 3 of the Convention."' 61 Thus, it is clear that the inter-
pretation by the European Commission tolerates physical mistreatment
not permissible under the voluntariness principle-a possibility that the
Diplock Commission apparently did not foresee.'
62
Two decisions on admissibility, handed down immediately before
and after the enactment of the EPA, illustrate well the nature of the
change that the implementation of the standard of the European Con-
vention was intended to effect. Shortly before the EPA established the
new admissibility standard, the Lord Chief Justice of Northern Ireland
held in Regina v. lynn 163 that confessions obtained at the Holywood
Army Barracks were inadmissible because the Barracks was "a set-up
officially organized and operated to gain information. . . from persons
who would otherwise have been less willing to give it."' 64 The Diplock
Report specifically criticized this decision, 165 and the Lord Chief Jus-
tice accommodated that criticism in an opinion delivered shortly after
the new standard took effect. In construing the new standard, he found
in Regina v. Corey166 that "[tihere is no need now to satisfy the judge
that a statement is voluntary in the sometimes technical sense which
that word has acquired in relation to criminal trials."'
167
158. Id at 501. Ironically, the Commission used these exact definitions in rendering its
opinion in the 1971 case of Ireland v. United Kingdom, which involved a number of com-
plaints of ill-treatment during interrogations at the Holywood Army Barracks between Au-
gust and December 1971. Ireland v. United Kingdom, 1978 E.C.H.R. 377, No. 5310/71
(judgement of Jan. 18, 1978). At the time of the complaint the Special Powers Act, the
predecessor of the EPA, was still in effect. See supra notes 29-32 and accompanying text.
159. 1971 Y.B. EUR. CoNy. ON HUMAN RIGHTS 250 (Eur. Comm'n on Human Rights).
160. Id at 252.
161. id at 276.
162. See supra note 144 and accompanying text.
163. (Belfast City Comm'n, May 23, 1972) (ruling by Lowry, L.C.J.), digestedin 23 N. Ir.
L.Q. 343 (1972).
164. Note, Admissibility of Confessions and the Common Law in Times of Emergency, 24
N. IR. L.Q. 199, 202 (1974) (quoting Regina v. Flynn (Belfast City Comm'n, May 23, 1972)).
165. DIPLOCK REPORT, supra note 62, para. 83, at 30.
166. Note, 1979 N. Ir. 49 (Belfast City Comm'n, Dec. 6, 1973) (ruling by Lowry, L.C.J.),
digestedin 25 N. IR. L.Q. 180 (1974).
167. 1979 N. Ir. 50.
305
The Yale Journal of World Public Order Vol. 8:284, 1982
Despite this apparent initial clarity, later cases have revealed that the
courts of Northern Ireland are deeply troubled by the departure from
the common law, and are finding the new standard difficult to interpret.
One leading case on section 8 which betrays this difficulty in Regina v.
McCormick,168 which concerned the admissibility of statements made
by five defendants charged with offenses ranging from murder to mem-
bership in a proscribed organization.169 After noting that the European
Convention cases permit "'a certain roughness of treatment,'" the
Lord Justice (the trial court judge) wrote that decisions under article 3
appear to contemplate the use of physical violence not permitted under
the common law standard. 170 He further argued that if the Diplock
standard were interpreted in the same way as article 3,171 it must be
read to permit the use of "a moderate degree of physical maltreatment
for the purpose of inducing a statement."'172 Put differently, the court
appeared to hold that a statement would be held admissible unless
"torture, inhuman or degrading treatment" in the sense described by
the European Commission was used for the purpose of inducing it. 173
Shifting directions, however, the opinion then examined the power
of judicial discretion, which, it maintained, provided non-statutory
control over the means by which statements are obtained. 174 It invoked
language from Regina v. Corey,175 the earlier case interpreting the sec-
tion 8 standard, to the effect that judges were still permitted to exclude
statements if their admission "'would not be in the interests of jus-
tice.'"176 Seizing on this "interests of justice" rationale, the opinion
excluded some of the statements at issue in McCormick because in its
view they had been induced by physical violence. 177
168. 1977 N. Ir. 105.
169. Id
170. Id at 110.
171. On this issue, the court asserted that
the terms torture or inhuman or degrading conduct in section 6 of the 1973 Act are
taken from Article 3 and Parliament in using these words was accepting as guidelines
the standards laid down in the European Convention on Human Rights and incorporat-
ing these in the domestic legislation.
Id at 109.
172. I d at I11.
173. Id
174. Id
175. See supra notes 166-67 and accompanying text.
176. 1977 N. Ir. at 112 (quoting Regina v. Corey (Belfast City Comm'n, Dec. 6, 1973)).
Judicial discretion permits the court to exclude statements which satisfy the strict legal tests
of admissibility, but which the court concludes could not be admitted without "operat[ing]
unfairly against a defendant." Collis v. Gunn, [1964] 1 Q.B. 495, 501. Like the principle of
voluntariness, which section 8 explicitly abandoned, it is deeply embedded in the common
law. See GARDINER REPORT, supra note 63, para. 47, at 16.
177. 1977 N. Ir. at 112. In a later case, Regina v. O'Halloran, the Lord Chief Justice
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In short, the opinion is contradictory. After apparently endorsing
the view that "it is open to an interviewer to use a moderate degree of
physical maltreatment for the purpose of inducing a statement,"'' 78 the
opinion excluded statements precisely on the ground that violence had
been used to obtain them. The rationale of the opinion was further
obscured by language in the conclusion to the effect that the discretion-
ary power "should not be exercised so as to defeat the will of Parlia-
ment as expressed" in section 8.179
The second basic ambiguity in the interpretation of section 8 is, how-
ever, precisely that the will of Parliament with respect to the judicial
power of discretion is impossible to determine. The Diplock Commis-
sion clearly intended that its proposed standard would suspend the
common law principle of voluntariness, and would remove from judges
the discretionary power to depart from the standard even should the
"interests of justice" require it.18 It seemed neither to anticipate the
use of physical violence in interrogation, nor to be aware that the case
law under article 3 permitted such conduct. 18
The Gardiner Committee, the only Parliamentary body to review the
EPA, conceded that reading the Diplock Report might lead one to be-
lieve that by enacting the EPA, Parliament had intended that judges no
longer have discretion over admissibility in trials of scheduled of-
fenses. 182 It rejected this view, however, and argued that Parliamentary
withdrawal of such well-established judicial power could only be made
in "clear terms,"'813 which the EPA failed to do. The Gardiner Report
favored an express statutory affirmation that judicial discretion was
unimpaired, and recommended a provision to that effect to Parlia-
ment.184 Such language has not been inserted, however.
In short, the language which the Gardiner Committee maintained
was necessary to remove the power of discretion has not been inserted
in the EPA. Nor has the language it suggested that would affirm ex-
appeared to deny the permissibility of any degree of physical violence. 1979 N. Ir. 45 (C.A.).
In dicta, he expressed doubt that even under the section 8 standard a court should ever
admit statements once violence had been shown to have occurred during the interrogation.
Id at 47.
178. 1977 N. Ir. at 111.
179. Id at 114.
180. The Diplock Report asserted that "the current technical rules, practice and judicial
discretion as to the admissibility of confessions ought to be suspended for the duration of the
emergency in respect of Scheduled Offences." DIPLOCK REPORT, supra note 62, para. 89, at
32.
181. See supra notes 153-61 and accompanying text.
182. GARDINER REPORT, supra note 63, para. 48, at 16-17.
183. Id at 17.
184. Id para. 50, at 17.
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plicitly the power of discretion. While Parliament has not resolved the
matter, some courts in Northern Ireland have concluded that their dis-
cretionary power still survives.
185
It seems fair to draw at least two conclusions from this confusion.
First, the section 8 standard is inherently ambiguous in two fundamen-
tal respects. First, the approach of the Diplock Commission and that of
the European Commission differ with respect to the permissibility of
the use of physical violence. This tension has not been resolved, and
the courts of Northern Ireland have been left with the difficult task of
reconciling the Diplock approach, which did not contemplate the use of
physical violence, 8 6 and the European Commission approach, which
has found "slaps or blows of the hand on the head or face not unac-
ceptable."' 187 In addition, it is not clear whether in trying to reconcile
these two approaches, the courts of Northern Ireland may invoke their
common law discretionary powers, although some have continued to
do so. 188
The second conclusion to be drawn is that it seems likely that the
confusion over the "torture, inhuman or degrading treatment" stan-
dard has contributed to the use of violence during interrogations. One
study of post-McCormick cases has concluded that "the possible exclu-
sion of statements did not act as an effective control of police malprac-
tice."' 189 The authors of the study asserted that the inherent ambiguity
of section 8 as revealed in judicial application may have persuaded
some interrogators that physical ill treatment was permissible. 90 Al-
though section 8 and the admissibility of confessions were, strictly
speaking, outside its mandate, 191 the Bennett Committee noted that
"the uncertainty, despite the standards upheld and applied by the
courts, about what is permissible and what is not, short of the use of
physical violence or ill treatment, may tempt police officers to see how
far they can go and what they can get away with."'192 It is clearly ques-
tionable whether the Commission's confidence that the application of
185. An evidence manual written by an R.U.C. investigator has concluded that the judi-
cial power of discretion survived the enactment of the EPA. See K. MASTERSON, supra note
137, at 25-26. Grier has concluded, rather safely, that "a precise analysis of the scope of the
judicial discretion in the context of section 8 is not yet feasible." Grier, supra note 109, at
224.
186. See supra notes 143-44 and accompanying text.
187. See supra notes 153-58 and accompanying text.
188. See supra notes 176-77 and accompanying text.
189. TEN YEARS ON, supra note 48, at 48.
190. Id
191. BENNETT REPORT, supra note 87, para. 3, at 2.
192. Id para. 84, at 31.
Vol. 8:284, 1982
Northern Ireland
the standard would prevent the use of physical violence was justified.
It is unquestionable that its general apprehension of the problems
likely to be caused by the standard was justified.
C. Defense of the New Standard- A Rebuttal
A defense of the new standard of admissibility would probably focus
on its ostensible efficacy. Concern that the standard may encourage
psychological or even physical violence is misplaced, it could be ar-
gued, because such violence can be justified in the name of community
safety. Confessions are crucial, given the present situation, because
witnesses are reluctant to testify out of fear of the terrorists or out of
general disrespect for the system of justice. Confessions are difficult to
obtain with traditional means of interrogation, however, because dedi-
cated terrorists are not likely to "crack" as would ordinary criminals.
In short, such a defense would squarely pose an alternative: a choice
must be made between violence in interrogation and violence in the
streets, and the former is to be preferred.
This defense is vulnerable to several attacks. In the first place, it can
be argued that questions of efficacy are simply irrelevant. The tech-
niques contemplated under section 8 are a priori unacceptable. The
psychological damage inflicted by the non-physical abuse may be just
as significant as that inflicted by more physical forms of persuasion.
The physical violence that is the inevitable product of the new standard
would never be tolerated as punishment for persons already proven
guilty. Accordingly, it cannot be accepted as an appropriate instrument
for use in the determination of guilt.
Even should the efficacy argument be accepted in principle, it can be
defeated on its own terms. The new admissibility standard has not, as
far as can be ascertained, contributed to a decline in the level of vio-
lence. While the overall level of violence fell sharply in the last four
months of 1976,193 this decline was in all likelihood due to the emer-
gence of the Peace People, a non-sectarian peace group which inspired
broad-based marches calling for an end to the conflict. 194 There was,
193. The indices for the measurement of terrorist activity showed declines of 30% to 60%
during the last four months of 1976 as compared with the same period for 1975. ROYAL
ULSTER CONSTABULARY, CHIEF CONSTABLE'S ANNUAL REPORT FOR 1977, at 72-73 (tables
1-5) (1978). Nonetheless, terrorist activity, as measured by the number of politically related
murders, ran at high levels in 1976, the first full year of the new emphasis on conviction in
courts of law. The data show the year to have been the third worst since the outbreak of the
violence in 1969. See ROYAL ULSTER CONSTABULARY, CHIEF CONSTABLE'S ANNUAL RE-
PORT 1982, at 48 (table 3) (1983).
194. See N.Y. Times, Sept. 5, 1976, at 15, col. 1;id, Oct. 24, 1976, at 18, col. 1;id, Nov.
28, at 17, col. 1.
309
The Yale Journal of World Public Order
however, no evidence that the interrogation practices tolerated under
section 8 were effective in decreasing the number of terrorist crimes,1 95
whatever their success in producing individual confessions. 196 In fact,
terrorist acts measured in number of deaths by violence and number of
terrorist incidents actually increased in 1976, the full first year in which
the new approach was employed. It is plausible that the interrogation
controversy increased opposition to government policies and added
new recruits to terrorist rolls, at least on the Republican side.
A second flaw in the efficacy argument is that it fails to take account
of data indicating that only a relatively small number of those interro-
gated under the new standard have been charged with a crime. For the
period between September, 1977 and August, 1978, only 37% of those
interrogated at Castlereagh and 24% of those interrogated at Gough
and Strand Road, Londonderry were ultimately charged. 197 During
the first ten months of 1980, only 8.6% of all those arrested under the
EPA were ever charged. 98 These figures admit of only two conclu-
sions: either large numbers of innocent people have been subjected to
prolonged interrogation, or prolonged interrogation failed in most
cases to produce a confession from those who had something to
confess.
Equally damaging to the efficacy defense of section 8 is the finding
by Boyle, Hadden and Hillyard that "the majority of those who did
make a confession did so relatively quickly."' 199 Fifty percent of all
those covered in their survey who chose to make a statement did so
within the first three hours of interrogation, and a further 25% within
the next three hours.2o Prolonged interrogation, stress, fatigue, and
mental and physical harassment do not appear to have been important
factors in inducing most confessions. Perhaps the extended interroga-
tions could be justified if it could be shown that the last 25% of the
confessions, those which were not forthcoming until after the initial six
hours of interrogation, came from hardened men and women of vio-
lence. The very fact that the government has never produced any data
which support this conclusion is suggestive; if evidence showing that
195. Despite the substantial decline at the end of the year, 297 politically related fatali-
ties occurred in 1976, as compared with 247 in 1975. ROYAL ULSTER CONSTABULARY,
CHIEF CONSTABLE'S ANNUAL REPORT FOR 1979, at 59 (table 6) (1980). Similarly, 3,339
terrorist incidents were reported in 1976, as compared with 2,496 in 1975. Id
196. Charges were brought against 708 terrorist suspects in 1976, more than double the
number for 1975. P. TAYLOR, supra note 116, at 80.
197. BENNETT REPORT, supra note 87, app. 1, at 141.
198. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
199. TEN YEARS ON, supra note 48, at 44-45.
200. Id at 45.
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those who confessed after prolonged interrogation tended to be those
most responsible for the violence, one must assume that it would have
been given wide publicity during the long period of criticism of the
security forces for their interrogation practices.20°
Whatever success section 8 may be claimed to have had in inducing
true confessions must be balanced against the significant danger that it
may also induce false confessions. The underlying rationale of the vol-
untariness principle was to guard against this danger, as well as to dis-
courage improper police practices.202 Although no clear proof of a
false confession has been found, substantial doubts about the validity
of confessions have been raised in a significant number of cases.
203
One R.U.C. detective, a member of an interrogation team, has esti-
mated that 2% of all those convicted were innocent.2°4 That would sug-
gest that between 1976 and 1977 over 50 innocent people were
convicted. 20
5
The last and most damaging argument to be made against those who
would justify section 8 on grounds of efficacy is that it contributes to
the perceived substantive unfairness in the legal system. 2°6 Police in-
terrogation practices as condoned by section 8 are certain to arouse
popular anger, and further diminish prospects for popular cooperation
with security forces. The Diplock Commission warned that "the repu-
tation of Courts of Justice would be sullied if they countenanced con-
victions on evidence obtained by methods which flout universally
accepted standards of behavior. '20 7 Ironically, however, section 8 is
contributing to precisely that result.
IV. Police Complaint Procedures
So long as extraordinary powers are conferred on the security forces
by statutes such as the EPA, it is essential that the exercise of these
powers be tempered by the establishment in Northern Ireland of proce-
dures for the independent investigation and evaluation of allegations of
police misconduct. The need for such procedures is made even more
pressing by the longstanding tradition of discrimination against the
Catholic minority in the administration ofjustice.208 Therefore, it must
201. See supra notes 116-24 and accompanying text.
202. R. CROSS, EVIDENCE 446-47 (2d ed. 1963).
203. TEN YEARS ON, su.pra note 48, at 46.
204. P. TAYLOR, supra note 116, at 339.
205. d
206. See supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text.
207. DIPLOCK REPORT, supra note 62, para. 89, at 32.
208. See supra notes 27-33 and accompanying text.
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be regarded as a critical failing of the legal system in Northern Ireland
that such procedures are virtually nonexistent.
The call for the establishment of procedures for the independent in-
vestigation of complaints was sounded almost as soon as the current
cycle of violence began in Northern Ireland in 1969. The Cameron
Report, which studied the rioting of that year, recommended the aban-
donment of the longstanding policy that only the Chief Constable insti-
tute disciplinary courts of inquiry,20 9 and that independent procedures
be established. 210 These recommendations were not adopted, however,
and despite further calls for the institution of such procedures, 21' and
the implementation of some superficial reforms, 212 the need remains as
pressing as ever.2 13
In 1970, the parliament of Northern Ireland significantly overhauled
the administration of the R.U.C. by the passage of the Police Act
(Northern Ireland),214 which removed the constabulary from the direct
control of the Minister of the Interior of Northern Ireland.215 The act
made the constabulary responsible to the Police Authority,216 a public
body appointed by the Governor of Northern Ireland 217 and to be com-
posed of diverse community representatives.21 8 Part of the Police Au-
thority's mandate was, and remains, to keep itself "informed as to the
manner in which complaints from the public against members of the
police force are dealt with by the Chief Constable. ' 21 9 As part of its
209. See Constabulary (Ireland) Act, 6 & 7 Will. 4, ch. 12, § 24.
210. CAMERON REPORT, supra note 38, at para. 230.
211. See GARDINER REPORT, supra note 63, para. 97, at 32.
212. See infra notes 222-28 and accompanying text.
213. This issue also has received substantial attention throughout the United Kingdom
as a whole. See REPORT OF A WORKING PARTY APPOINTED BY THE HOME SECRETARY ON
THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN INDEPENDENT ELEMENT IN THE INVESTIGATION OF COMPLAINTS
AGAINST THE POLICE, CMD. 5; No. 8193 (1981) (Lord Plowden, Chairman) (rejecting the
establishment of independent investigations in favor of reliance on investigation by officers
from other forces); REPORT OF AN INQUIRY INTO THE BRIXTON DISORDERS, CMD. 5, No.
8422 (1981) (Lord Scarman, Chairman) (concluding after analysis of the causes of the
Brixton race riots that independent evaluation of complaints is appropriate).
214. 1970 N. Ir. Pub. Gen. Acts, ch. 9.
215. Id § 1.
216. Id
217. Id § 1(3), sched. 1, §§ 1-9. After the imposition of direct rule from Westminster,
control over the Police Authority was vested in the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland.
218. Id This reform was instituted at the recommendation of the Hunt Committee,
which had been appointed in the wake of the 1969 rioting to analyze the structure of the
police force. See REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITrEE ON POLICE IN NORTHERN IRE-
LAND, N. IR. CMD., No. 535, at 3 (1969) (J. Hunt, Chairman) [hereinafter HUNT REPORT].
The committee found that the police were too directly responsible to elected officials in a
political system in which victory virtually was guaranteed to the members of a single party.
Id paras. 84-85, at 21-22.
219. 1970 N. Ir. Pub. Gen. Acts, ch. 9, § 12(1). The wording of the statute speaks of the
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general power to keep itself informed, the Authority can request re-
ports on complaints and investigations, 220 and in cases that affect "the
public interest," can require the Chief Constable to convene a tribunal
of inquiry.2
2'
The issue of police complaint procedures has received extensive at-
tention in Northern Ireland since the publication of the Cameron Re-
port. In addition to proposing the establishment of the Police
Authority, the Hunt Commission recommended that complaints be in-
vestigated by police officers from counties different from those of the
officers being investigated, 222 and the Black Report, which reviewed the
problem once more in 1974, found that this reform had been imple-
mented.223 In the meantime, the Gardiner Report had called for the
establishment of independent procedures,224 but this proposal was re-
jected by the Black Report, which instead endorsed the establishment
of a Police Complaint Board.225 Finally, the Bennett Report of 1979
recommended further limited reforms, including a policy that in cases
that have aroused "public disquiet," every effort be made to use investi-
gating officers from other police forces in the United Kingdom.22 6
Despite all this attention to the problem, the basic structure remains
the same. As the Black Report endorsed as a fundamental principle,
227
and as the Bennett Report accepted for what it claimed was the lack of
a better altemative,228 operational control over the investigation of
complaints remains in the hands of the police. While four separate
procedures for the investigation of complaints have been established,
none can be called independent in any meaningful sense. Thus, the
complaint procedures remain inadequate, and the public perception of
the legal system suffers as a result.
A. Criminal Prosecution by the Director of Public Prosecutions
Under regulations issued pursuant to the 1970 Police Authority Act,
the Chief Constable is the disciplinary authority for all ranks up to and
"Inspector General," but regulations issued since its enactment have replaced that phrase
with the phrase "Chief Constable." BENNrEr REPORT, supra note 87, para. 284, at 96.
220. 1970 N. Ir. Pub. Gen. Acts, ch. 9, § 15(2).
221. Id § 13.
222. HUNT REPORT, supra note 218, para. 133, at 32.
223. REPORT OF THE WORKING PARTY FOR NORTHERN IRELAND, CMD. 5, No. 6475
(1975) (Sir Harold Black, Chairman) [hereinafter BLACK REPORT].
224. GARDINER REPORT, supra note 63, para. 98, at 32.
225. BLACK REPORT, supra note 223, para. 53, at 16. This reform was instituted in 1977.
See infra notes 259-71 and accompanying text.
226. BENETr REPORT, supra note 87, para. 357, at 118.
227. BLACK REPORT, supra note 223, para. 22(i), at 8.
228. Id para. 356, at 117-18.
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including Chief Superintendent, while the Police Authority is given re-
sponsibility for the higher ranks.229 The authority for the lower ranks
has been delegated to a Senior Deputy Chief Constable, who evaluates
the complaint in the first instance and then assigns a member of the
Complaints and Discipline branch of the R.U.C. to investigate it.23°
After the investigator's report has been reviewed, the Chief Constable
must send it to the Director of Public Prosecutions (D.P.P.) unless he is
"satisfied that no criminal offence has been committed."'23'
Under Article 5 of the Prosecution of Offences Order,232 the decision
to press any criminal charge, including the indictment of a police of-
ficer, is entirely the responsibility of the D.P.P., whose discretion in this
regard is subject only to his accountability to the Attorney General of
the United Kingdom. 233 The inherent weakness of this putative inde-
pendence is apparent, however, in that the Order establishes no power
of investigation, and, in fact, the D.P.P. has no staff for investigation.234
Any further information required by the D.P.P. must be requested
from the Chief Constable.235 Thus, the prosecution decision is only
nominally an independent one; the D.P.P.'s dependence on the R.U.C.
for the investigation of any complaint against members of the R.U.C. is
absolute.
B. A U. C. Disciplinary Procedures
The role of the D.P.P. in the evaluation of complaints against the
police is to determine whether the senior police officer's report contains
sufficient evidence upon which to initiate criminal proceedings against
the accused policeman.2 36 A variety of factors, including the credibility
of potential witnesses, the admissibility of evidence, and the presence
of competing demands on limited staff may influence the D.P.P.'s deci-
sion.237 None of these factors may necessarily address the issue of
whether an assault or some other behavior warranting disciplinary ac-
229. R.U.C. (Complaints) Regulations, 1977 STAT. R. & O.N. IR., No. 235; R.U.C. (Dis-
cipline and Disciplinary Appeals) Regulations, 1977 STAT. R. & O.N. IR., No. 236.
230. BENNETr REPORT, supra note 87, para. 285, at 97.
231. 1970 N. Ir. Pub. Gen. Acts, ch. 9, § 13(5). Pursuant to powers conferred by the
Prosecution of Offences Order, the D.P.P. has required the Chief Constable to send it any
allegation of criminal conduct made against a police officer. Prosecution of Offences
(Northern Ireland) Order, 1972 STAT. INST., No. 538, art. 6(3)(b); see BEanF-r REPORT,
supra note 87, para. 286, at 97.
232. Prosecution of Offences (Northern Ireland) Order, supra note 231, art. 5.
233. Id
234. BEN=Er REPORT, supra note 87, para. 288, at 98.
235. Id





tion has occurred. Nonetheless, the R.U.C. has consistently interpreted
British double jeopardy rules to require that if the D.P.P. has consid-
ered and rejected criminal charges against a constable or police officer,
internal disciplinary action is automatically precluded. The result of
this interpretation has been substantially to undercut whatever role the
R.U.C. internal disciplinary procedure might play in the investigation
of complaints against the police.
The literal wording of the double jeopardy rule would not appear to
require that a decision not to prosecute rule out internal disciplinary
proceedings. According to the Police Order of 1977, "where a member
of the police force has been acquitted or convicted of a criminal offence
he shall not be liable to be charged with any offence against discipline
which is in substance the same as the offence of which he has been
acquitted or convicted."2 3'8 As the Bennett Report pointed out, how-
ever, "[a]cquitted means, of course, acquitted by a court, but, in the
application of the 'double jeopardy' rule, 'acquitted' has also been
taken to refer in some degree to decisions by the Director of Public
Prosecutions that there should be no prosecution. '239 It also noted that
the R.U.C. approach to the double jeopardy rule has been more abso-
lute than was intended.240 Nonetheless, the R.U.C. disciplinary ma-
chinery, which could play an important role in controlling misconduct
that falls below the level of an indictable offense but that is still
counterproductive or unbecoming, will not investigate a case in which
the D.P.P. has declined to prosecute.
C. Tribunals of Inquiry
A third procedure for the evaluation of complaints against the police
is that the Police Authority can require the establishment of a tribunal
of inquiry.241 In cases in which the complaint "relates to a matter af-
fecting or appearing to affect the public interest, ' 242 the Police Author-
ity can require the Chief Constable to refer the complaint to a tribunal
consisting of a lawyer appointed by the Lord Chief Justice of Northern
Ireland and two police officers appointed by the Authority itself.
243
238. Police (Northern Ireland) Order, 1977 STAT. INST., No. 53, art. 14.
239. BENNETT REPORT, supra note 87, para. 364, at 120.
240. Id para. 365, at 121. This policy has continued despite the issuance in 1977 of a
Home Office circular that warned specifically against an overly broad application of the
double jeopardy rule in the context of police disciplinary procedures. Id
241. Police (Northern Ireland) Act, 1970, ch. 9, § 13(2).
242. Id
243. Id § 13(3). These officers may be affiliated with any police force in the United
Kingdom. Id
315
The Yale Journal of World Public Order
Although the tribunal option would appear to offer some promise of
independent investigation, as of 1979 it had been invoked only once
since the Police Authority was established in 1970.244 The number of
complaints has remained relatively constant; in 1972, 2,617 complaints
were filed, and in 1979, 2,183 were filed.245 To discharge its statutory
mandate to keep itself informed of complaints against the police, the
Police Authority during this period relied exclusively on the reports it
received from the R.U.C. It had considered the tribunal option only
twice before the first and only establishment of a tribunal of inquiry,
which was appointed in 1979 to consider the case of James Rafferty.
246
The facts and aftermath of the Rafferty case suggest that any hope
that the tribunal of inquiry might be able to exercise independent in-
vestigatory power is misplaced. After his arrest on November 11, 1976,
Rafferty, who had no prior criminal record, was interrogated for three
days.247 Upon his release he was examined by two doctors, one a po-
lice surgeon, who found him to be suffering severe bruises and a spinal
laceration, and who recoamnended urgent hospital treatment.248 Raf-
ferty was hospitalized for four days after his release, during which time
the extent of his injuries was confirmed by two more doctors, one a
Fellow of the Royal College of Surgeons.249 No criminal charge was
ever brought against him.
Although the matter was raised by one of its own members almost
immediately after the incident, for two years the Police Authority re-
fused repeated requests to initiate a tribunal of inquiry.250 During that
period the investigations undertaken by the R.U.C. and by the D.P.P.
both came to naught. 251 Finally, in October, 1978, the Police Authority
agreed that a tribunal should hear the case, and in the spring of 1979,
the tribunal was appointed.252 The tribunal began to hear testimony in
December, 1980.253 After medical testimony corroborated the severity
of his injuries, Rafferty himself testified. Certain cross examination of
244. BENNETT REPORT, supra note 84, para. 392, at 130. During the same period, almost
20,000 formal complaints were filed against the police, including 1,382 alleging an assault
during interrogation, during the period from 1976 to 1978. Id app. II, at 142 (data supplied
by the R.U.C.).
245. NORTHERN IRELAND CIVIL RIGHTS AsSOCIATION, THE RAFFERTY FILE 13 (1980)
(copy on file with The Yale Journal of World Public Order) [hereinafter RAFFERTY FILE].
246. P. TAYLOR, supra note 116, at 105.
247. Id at 88.
248. Id at 96.
249. Id Rafferty was also found to be suffering from some degree of amnesia. Id at 97.
250. Id at 97-105.
251. Id
252. Id at 105.
253. RAFFERTY FILE, supra note 245, at 7.
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Rafferty by counsel for the police witnesses was ruled improper, where-
upon counsel and the police witnesses refused to participate further in
the proceedings.254 Following this action, the tribunal sought and ob-
tained subpoenas that required the police witnesses to testify.255 Six of
the witnesses appealed this decision, and nine days later Lord Justice
Gibson quashed the subpoenas, 256 ruling that the tribunal was not ex-
ercising a judicial function and therefore could not avail itself of the
subpoena power of the courts.257 This decision effectively ended the
inquiry, for the police witnesses indicated that, at the advice of counsel,
they would not participate further in the inquiry unless legally com-
pelled to do so.258 Thus, the Police Authority's first and heretofore
only tribunal of inquiry, held four years after the occurrence of the
incident it was to investigate, broke up after two days of testimony.
Any confidence that the community might have had in its institutional
capacity to conduct independent investigations was perhaps perma-
nently destroyed.
D. The Police Complaints Board
The fourth procedure for the evaluation of complaints lies with the
Police Complaints Board, which consists of at least six members,
259
none of whom may be affiliated with a police force.260 According to
the Black Report, which endorsed the establishment of the Board,
261
the rationale underlying its creation was to introduce "some form of
independent scrutiny" into the investigation of complaints made
against the R.U.C. but which are not referred to the D.P.P.262 The
Board was intended neither to make its own investigations, 263 nor to
usurp the position of the D.P.P.;264 rather, by receiving copies of com-
plaints and investigation reports, 265 it was to consult with and make
recommendations to the Chief Constable about possible internal disci-
254. Id
255. See In re Sterritt, 1980 N. Ir. 234, 234.
256. Id
257. Id
258. Id at 235. Lord Justice Gibson called the result "singularly unfortunate," but held
that the law left him no room for a diffelent decision. Id at 240.
259. Police (Northern Ireland) Order, supra note 238, art. 3(1).
260. Id art. 3(2).
261. BLACK REPORT, supra note 223, para. 53, at 15-16.
262. Id para. 16, at 6-7; see supra notes 229-31 and accompanying text.
263. BLACK REPORT, supra note 223, para. 22(i), at 8.
264. Id para. 22(ii), at 8.
265. Police (Northern Ireland), Order, supra note 238, art. 5.
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plinary procedures. 266 The Board is not sent copies of complaints that
the Chief Constable forwards to the D.P.P. until after the question of
criminal proceedings has been settled.
267
The fundamental problem with this structure is that because virtu-
ally all complaints made against the police allege some criminal con-
duct,268 they are therefore sent first to the D.P.P.269 Thus, the Board is
not involved in the evaluation of any complaint that alleges criminal
conduct; either the D.P.P. presses criminal charges, which eliminates
any role for the Board, or the D.P.P. does not, which, given the peculiar
interpretation of the double jeopardy rule in Northern Ireland, has the
same effect. 27
0
In short, the Police Complaint Board's power is confined to whatever
role it might play with the Chief Constable concerning the appropriate-
ness of internal disciplinary proceedings in those rare cases in which
criminal behavior is not alleged in the complaint at issue. Even this
limited power has not been used effectively,271 and if it were, it is the
possible criminal behavior of members of the R.U.C., not minor disci-
plinary infractions, with which the public is most concerned. Thus, it is
most unlikely that the Board will ever play an important role in the
investigation of complaints against the police.
E. The Needfor Independent Investigations
No procedure for the independent investigation of complaints
against the police yet exists in Northern Ireland. Criminal prosecution
by the D.P.P., the tribunals of inquiry, and the Police Complaint Board
are all thoroughly dependent on the cooperation of the R.U.C. The
constabulary's internal disciplinary powers, even should they be exer-
cised in good faith, are seriously handicapped by the interpretation of
the double jeopardy rule. Until this failing is remedied, public confi-
266. Id art. 6. As a power of last resort the Board can compel the Chief Constable to
initiate a disciplinary hearing. Id art. 6(2).
267. Id art. 8(1).
268. See BEniNEr REPORT, supra note 87, para. 329, at 110.
269. Id; see supra notes 229-31 and accompanying text.
270. See supra notes 236-40 and accompanying text. In a special report to the Secretary
of State, the Board itself expressed the view that the extent of the restriction on its scope
caused by the double jeopardy rule was not fully appreciated by its members at the time of
their appointment, and that the rule "constitutes a serious curtailment" of the effectiveness
of their role. BENNETr REPORT, supra note 87, para. 397, at 132.
271. The Bennett Report noted that as of March, 1979, the Board had not exercised any
of its powers. Id para. 398, at 132. In June, 1981, an independent investigatory group
found that the Police Complaint Board and the tribunals of inquiry, whose weakness had
been betrayed in the Rafferty case, were "equally ineffective." THE ADMINISTRATION OF




dence in the legal system, so important to the achievement of a peaceful
solution to the conflict, will remain seriously diminished.
Two factors guarantee that even if the R.U.C. changed its interpreta-
tion of the double jeopardy rule to permit departmental investigations
despite a decision not to prosecute, independent investigations would
still be required. The first, not unique to Northern Ireland, is the inher-
ent difficulty in asking members of the police force to investigate their
colleagues. Members of the R.U.C., like policemen everywhere, share
a spirit of loyalty and are anxious not to harm a fellow officer perform-
ing a difficult job. This spirit of corporate unity, no doubt made even
more intense by the deaths of 173 members of the police at the hands of
terrorists between 1969 and 1982,272 inevitably penetrates and weakens
the independence and objectivity of police investigations.
The second factor arguing in favor of the need to establish independ-
ent complaint procedures is a legal one which concerns the possibility
of conflict of interest. In cases in which the complaint stems from po-
lice conduct during an interrogation, the complainant may have been
charged with a criminal offense on the basis of his or her admission. A
vigorous investigation of the complaint may have the effect of render-
ing inadmissible the confession made by the criminal defendant qua
complainant. In light of this circumstance, the Bennett Commission
found that the "investigation of a complaint will consciously or uncon-
sciously be influenced by the wish to support the Crown case against
the complainant." 273 A vigorous investigation of a complaint may be
viewed not only as a slap against fellow officers, but also as an actual
reward for criminal defendants. Thus, a conflict of interest inevitably
is presented to the prosecutor who directs the investigation of the com-
plaint and to the police who perform the actual investigation itself.
So long as no independent investigation of complaints against the
police exists in Northern Ireland, the perception of discrimination in
the administration of justice, already so deeply rooted in the Catholic
community,274 is bound to continue. Thus, one important goal of the
last decade of British policy in Northern Ireland-public acceptance of
the R.U.C. as "civilian, impartial, and accountable" 275-is bound to
fail. The data show that only fourteen prosecutions were pressed
against police officers in the years 1976 through 1979, and not a single
272. ROYAL ULSTER CONSTABULARY, CHIEF CONSTABLE'S ANNUAL REPORT 1982, at 48
(table 6) (1983).
273. BENNETT REPORT, supra note 87, para. 352, at 117.
274. See supra notes 27-33 and accompanying text.
275. HUNT REPORT, supra note 218, para. 176; see AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, supra
note 111, at 1-2.
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conviction was obtained.276 Despite the wave of negative publicity that
preceded the appointment of the Bennett Committee, at the time its
report was issued not a single police officer had been convicted of a
crime arising out of a maltreatment claim.277 The Standing Advisory
Committee on Human Rights has repeatedly urged that "justice must
not only be done, it must be seen to be done." 278 Given the present
state of the procedures for the investigation of complaints against the
police, it is hardly surprising that many people neither see justice being
done, nor believe that it is being done at all.
V. Ameliorating the Situation: An Agenda for Reform
Incremental reforms can be implemented that would help convince
the public that a system offering substantive and procedural fairness
can be built in Northern Ireland. Indeed, the very implementation of
reforms in the admissibility standard and in the procedures for the in-
vestigation of complaints made against the police would send a clear
signal that the authorities themselves are determined to govern within
reasonable limits prescribed by law, and without resort to "emergency"
powers that invite arbitrary and capricious misuse. No reform can be
expected to eradicate overnight centuries of hatred and mistrust. Sensi-
ble and feasible measures are available, however, that could begin the
process of building confidence in the rule of law that is the surest
weapon against those who would resort to violent and extra-legal
means to achieve their objectives.
A. Interrogation Practices and the Admissibility Standard of
Section 8
The fact that the admissibility standard of section 8 of the EPA is
derived from the European Convention on Human Rights does not jus-
tify ignoring the manifold problems it has created. Decisions under the
Convention appear to condone the use of physical violence in interro-
gations by the police, and the standard's imprecision has made impossi-
ble the coherent judicial interpretation of its requirements. Reforms
must be implemented to resolve both these difficulties.
276. P. TAYLOR, supra note 116, at 58.
277. BENNETT REPORT, supra note 87, para. 157, at 52. During this period 19 officers
were prosecuted. Of these, 16 were acquitted outright, in one case the prosecution declined
to continue after trial had begun, and 2 convictions were reversed on appeal. Id
278. See STANDING ADVISORY CoMMITrEE ON HUMAN RIGHTS, FIFTH REPORT (1980)
(on file with The Yale Journal of World Public Order). The committee was created by the




1. Physical Violence in Interrogation Is Counterproductive and Should
Be Specjlcally Proscribed
The use of physical violence in interrogation is counterproductive in
at least two ways: (1) as the Diplock Commission recognized, it may
prevent the development of any rapport between the person questioned
and the questioners; and (2) it only exacerbates the atmosphere of com-
munity distrust that permeates Northern Ireland. An explicit and abso-
lute ban on its use might make possible more effective interrogation
and certainly would improve community relations.
To make such a ban meaningful, the message must be clearly con-
veyed to all concerned that not only will evidence that has been ob-
tained by the use or threat of violence be excluded from the courts, but
that members of the police force who violate the proscription will be
punished. The promulgation of a code of permissible interrogation
practices would constitute a useful first step in the communication of
such a message.279 In addition, the establishment of independent pro-
cedures for the evaluation of complaints made against the police would
deter further abuse and assure the public that the problem is taken seri-
ously by the authorities.
2. The Admissibility Standard of Section 8 Should Be Abolished and
the Common Law Test of Voluntariness Restored
The practical operation of section 8 has created serious problems that
have not been offset by any compensating increase in public safety.
This fact should be recognized, and the standard abolished. The vol-
untariness test should be restored, together with a re-affirmation of the
power of judicial discretion to exclude admissions of dubious probative
value or ones made under questionable circumstances. Other provi-
sions of the EPA have provided the security forces sufficient powers of
investigation and detention such that this counterproductive and unfair
standard can be safely abandoned.
B. The Investigation of Complaints Against the Police
The clear lack of any power of independent investigation in the
hands of the D.P.P., the Police Authority, or the Police Complaints
Board and the regular acquittals in the few prosecutions of members of
the police preclude the development within the Catholic community of
any feeling of confidence in the fairness or impartiality of the R.U.C.
279. See BENNETr REPORT, supra note 87, paras. 180-83, at 63-64. Professors Boyle,
Hadden, and Hillyard have drafted such a code that could serve as a model on which to base
the regulation of interrogation practices. TEN YEARs ON, supra note 48, at 110-13.
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That confidence is especially important in a society in which the police
are, and have been for decades, vested with special emergency powers
of unreviewable discretion that permit the detention of suspects for
days without charge. A thoroughgoing reform of the procedures for
the investigation of complaints against the police is essential in a com-
munity in which distrust between members of a minority community
on the one hand, and members of the security forces and the majority
community on the other, is rampant.
1. The Rule Against Double Jeopardy Must Be Construed Literally
A decision by the D.P.P. not to prosecute should not result in the
absolution of those accused of disciplinary offenses that do not rise to
the level of criminal behavior. The use of internal disciplinary machin-
ery should not be confused with the public prosecution of a criminal
offense. Misconduct which is less than criminal still may merit discipli-
nary sanction, and the R.U.C.'s interpretation of the double jeopardy
rule should be changed to take cognizance of this fact.
2. Complaints Must Be Investigated by Persons Institutionally
Independent from Those Persons Being Investigated
Systems for the investigation of complaints made against the police
generally involve four steps--the receipt of the complaint, the investi-
gation of the complaint, the determination whether to initiate proceed-
ings, be they disciplinary or judicial, and the ultimate resolution of the
complaint. Independence can be established at any or all of these
steps. 280 It can be ensured by establishing a special police unit to inves-
tigate complaints, or by creating an oversight position in the form of an
ombudsman.
A special police unit established solely to investigate complaints
against the police should be designed to take account of the need to
protect police morale as well as the need for the thorough and in-
dependent investigation of complaints. As a full-time body, the unit
would be able to develop expertise in the investigation of complaints.
280. The author has surveyed elsewhere possible methods for the creation of such inde-
pendence. See T. FOLEY, COMPLAINTS AGAINST THE POLICE (1980) (mimeo) (copy on file
with The Yale Journal of World Public Order). See also Note, The Administration of Com-
plaints by Civilians Against the Police, 77 HARV. L. Rnv. 499 (1964); Grant, Complaints
Against the Police--the North-American Experience, 23 CRiM. L. REv. 338 (1976) (indepen-
dence in the determination and resolution of charges); Hudson, Police Review Boards and
Police Accountability, 36 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBs. 515 (1971) (survey of complaints proce-
dures with emphasis on police cooperation); Lenzi, Reviewing Civilian Complaints of Police
Misconduct, 48 TEMPLE L.Q. 89 (1974) (analysis of alleged systematic violations of constitu-




Its independence from other branches of the police and the freedom of
its members from ordinary police work should serve to insulate it to a
substantial degree from the pressures typically created by the investiga-
tion of fellow officers. This independence should serve to impress the
public with the seriousness with which the police examine allegations
of wrongdoing, although public perception in Northern Ireland will de-
pend ultimately on the achievement of demonstrably fair results. That
such a unit can successfully identify and investigate problems within
the ranks of police has been demonstrated elsewhere.
2 81
A second alternative to the present system would be the creation of
an ombudsman, a Public Complaints Commissioner, who would have
the authority to scrutinize all investigations of complaints within a cer-
tain period after the receipt of the complaint by the police.282 A staff of
civilian investigators would assist the ombudsman, who would possess
full subpoena power, the right of access to police records, and the
power to order public hearings on the basis of either the staff or police
investigations.
A combination of the two approaches-the creation of both special
investigation unit and an ombudsman-would be an ideal solution to
the complaint problem in Northern Ireland. Under this plan, a special
investigation unit would answer to the Chief Constable, but its actions
would be monitored by an ombudsman.28 3 The ombudsman would
play several roles-he or she could receive complaints independently of
the police, serve as a conciliator in cases calling for informal resolution,
monitor ongoing investigations, and conduct investigations when the
circumstances require. Providing the ombudsman with an independent
staff empowered to compel testimony and the production of documents
by the police would eliminate the problems encountered heretofore by
281. See Get the cops, ECONOMIST, May 28, 1977, at 71 (successful investigations of cor-
ruption in the Hong Kong police); Sins of the fathers, ECONOMIST, June 25, 1977, at 23
(efforts of Scotland Yard special investigating team to uncover police corruption). The res-
ignations from the constabulary of the corrupt officers identified by the Scotland Yard team
are reported to have increased public confidence in the police and heightened departmental
morale. Id
282. For general discussions of the ombudsman concept, see Gellhorn, The Norwegian
Ombudsman, 18 STAN. L. REv. 293 (1966); Gellhorn, Finland's Official Watchmen, 114 U.
PA. L. REv. 327 (1966); Gellhorn, Settling Disagreements with Officials in Japan, 79 HARV. L.
REv. 685 (1966). A police complaints ombudsman was established in Toronto in July, 1981.
Civilians Are Watching the Watchmen, MACLEANS, Aug. 24, 1981, at 54. The possible estab-
lishment of such a position has received extensive attention in Australia. See AUSTRALIAN
LAW REFORM COMMISSION, REPORT No. 1: COMPLAINTS AGAINST THE POLICE (1979);
AUSTRALIAN LAW REFORM COMMISSION, REPORT No. 9: COMPLAINTS AGAINST THE PO-
LICE (Supplementary Report 1980).
283. This approach is under review by the Australian Law Reform Commission. See
AUSTRALAN LAW REFORM COMMISSION, REPORT No. 1, supra note 282, paras. 65-79, at 17-
21.
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the Police Authority and the Police Complaints Board. Public hearings
ordered under the ombudsman's powers would have real authority, in
contrast to the tribunals of inquiry, and would be likely to produce full
police cooperation. Although this approach would not institutionalize
a completely independent investigation process, it would accommodate
the demands of investigative competence and objectivity, police mo-
rale, and public confidence.
No procedure for the investigation of complaints against the police
can operate effectively without police cooperation. Moreover, a police
force cannot function effectively without the consent and support of the
community it serves. The Chief Constable has, therefore, two mutually
reinforcing interests-the enforcement of respect for the law among the
constabulary and the encouragement of community support and re-
spect for the rule of law, which is critical to effective law enforcement.
Criminal activity, whether committed by police or terrorists, under-
mines respect for law if left unpunished. The public's revulsion at acts
of violence is the natural ally of the police, but the lack of an independ-
ent procedure for the investigation of complaints deprives the constab-
ulary of the support which could be so important in the struggle for
peace in Northern Ireland.
Legal institutions and protections will not themselves eradicate the
generations of mistrust in Northern Ireland. But as the public's pa-
tience with the terrorism committed in its name wears thin, desire for
the rule of law undoubtedly will grow stronger. This popular desire for
fair and effective law enforcement will not materialize, however, unless
a legal system is established in which justice not only is done, but is
seen to be done. In Northern Ireland, where memories are understand-
ably long, reforms of the kind suggested in this Article must be imple-
mented if this critical goal is to be achieved.
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